The stability and growth pact: lessons from the great recession. by Larch, Martin et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The stability and growth pact: lessons
from the great recession.
Martin Larch and Paul Van den Noord and Lars Jonung
European Commission - General Directorate Economic and
Financial Affairs, OECD, Lund University
November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27900/
MPRA Paper No. 27900, posted 9. January 2011 19:30 UTC
 11 November 2010 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact:  
Lessons from the Great Recession. 
 
 
Martin Larch*, Paul van den Noord**, Lars Jonung*** 
*Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission 
** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
*** Lund University, Swedish Fiscal Policy Council  
 
Abstract 
While current instruments of EU economic policy coordination helped stave off a full-
scale depression, the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis has revealed a 
number of weaknesses in the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU framework for fiscal 
surveillance and fiscal policy coordination. This paper provides a diagnosis of how the 
SGP faired ahead and during the present crisis and offers a first comprehensive review of 
the ongoing academic and policy debate, including an account of the reform proposals 
adopted by the Commission on 29 September 2010. In our view, the current system of 
EU rules is unbalanced. It consists of (i) very specific provisions on how to conduct 
fiscal policy making in normal times with no effective enforcement mechanisms, and of 
(ii) no or extremely tight provisions for really bad economic times, like the Great 
Recession. A two-pronged approach as outlined in this report is needed to revive the 
Pact: tighter enforcement, coupled with broader macroeconomic surveillance, in good 
times and an open window for exceptionally bad times, including a crisis resolution 
mechanism at the EU level.  
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You never let a serious crisis go to waste. And what I mean by that it's an opportunity to 
do things you think you could not do before.  
Rahm Emanuel, White House Chief of Staff, 19 November 2008. 
Governments use the myth of nationhood to which they owe their existence to obstruct or 
delay a EU government, and to cling to the simulacrum of their power even now that the 
problems they need to address have become so much larger than they can handle. 
Tommaso Paddoa Schioppa, former member of the ECB Board and 
Italian Finance Minister, Chairman of Notre Europe, BEPA Monthly 
Brief, Issue 27, May 2010. 
[For] all its merits, the original system of governance for the European single currency 
was intellectually and politically schizophrenic. On the one hand, it represented the 
culmination of 40 years of integration, based on the obvious inadequacy of national 
procedures to confront continental and global challenges. On the other hand, it was 
concerned with preserving absolute national sovereignty in fiscal, budgetary and 
macroeconomic matters. 
Peter Sutherland, Former European Union Commissioner, Financial 
Times, 30 June 2010. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis that hit the global and European economies since the summer of 2007 
is without precedent in post-war economic history, comparable to the events that 
triggered the Great Depression of the 1930s (European Commission, 2009). Fortunately, 
the lessons from the Great Depression have been taken at heart. In the Great Recession 
governments and central banks have been well aware of the need to avoid the policy 
mistakes that were common at the time, also in the EU and the euro area. Large-scale 
bank runs have been avoided, monetary policy has been eased aggressively, and 
governments have released substantial and targeted fiscal stimulus. Countries have not 
resorted to protectionism at the scale of the 1930s. It demonstrates the importance of EU 
economic policy coordination.  
Nevertheless, the post-2007 global financial and economic crisis has revealed a number 
of weaknesses in the EU fiscal surveillance framework, the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). Policymakers ended up doing the right things, not because of the framework, but 
in spite of it. In clear contrast to the first crisis of the Pact in November 2003, when 
Germany and France decided to flout the provisions of EU fiscal surveillance, many 
observers no longer believe the Pact can be mended. The focus is no longer on how to 
improve this or that part of surveillance as was the case in 2004-05 (see Jonung et al. 
2008). The prevailing view seems to be the following: do not shed additional tears on a 
dead body; rather concentrate on what to do when the chips are down (see for instance 
Baldwin and Gros, 2010). We do not share this gloomy view. We acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the Pact mark-II, yet believe it is worth preserving and can and should 
be revived. 
In 2007 many Member States recorded fiscal balances which, on the face of it, looked 
pretty comfortable: in the euro area as a whole the headline deficit declined to 0.6% of 
GDP, down from 1.3% of GDP in 2006, the lowest level in more than a decade. In terms 
of the prevailing macroeconomic paradigm the situation looked fairly virtuous. Progress 
towards fiscal sustainability coupled with low and stable inflation was exactly what 
macroeconomists prescribed. Other macroeconomic imbalances such as large current 
account deficits, booming real estate and asset prices in some peripheral European 
countries were not completely ignored but were not thought to pose serious risks to 
overall macro financial stability either. 
Then came the crisis which imposed a sobering reassessment of the economic situation. 
On the fiscal side it became clear that seemingly favourable figures had masked at least 
two important elements. First, budgetary improvements, achieved on the back of 
particularly tax rich economic growth, had partly been used to increase government 
expenditure. As the crisis unfolded, the ensuing free fall of revenues exposed the missed 
opportunity to consolidate and weighed markedly on the available fiscal space. A similar, 
yet much less pervasive pattern had been observed during the ITC boom-bust cycle of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Second, as they started unwinding, imbalances outside 
the government sector translated, to a significant degree, into government liabilities; e.g. 
large amounts of liquidity were pumped into the banking sector in a bid to prevent a 
financial meltdown. The Pact failed to prevent this from happening. 
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Another major flaw emerging from the crisis has been the lack of provisions to manage 
and mitigate severe economic stress and/or outright crisis. Although the 2005 reform of 
the Pact had introduced a considerable degree of flexibility, the SGP did not and still 
does not allow for discretionary fiscal expansions, unless a country has significantly 
overachieved its budgetary objectives. The stabilisation function of fiscal policy is 
entrusted exclusively to automatic stabilisers which may be allowed to play fully only if 
a Member State has reached its medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). In this respect, 
the call for expansionary fiscal policies included in the European Economic Recovery 
Plan adopted by the Commission and endorsed by the Council at the end of 2008 was in 
conflict, probably not with the spirit, but certainly with the letter of the Pact.  
Aside from the Pact’s failure to either prevent or cater for the mitigation of the current 
crisis, EU economic governance also lacks a framework for crisis resolution, notably 
when it becomes a sovereign debt crisis. EU economic governance was again flat-footed 
when faced with the Greek sovereign debt crisis. A scenario had opened that had not 
been considered by the architects of the Treaty and the SGP, namely that of a member of 
the euro area becoming insolvent and/or defaulting on its debt. To avert the worst, ad hoc 
measures were put in place in far from ideal conditions. 
To be fair, it would be wrong to conclude the European Commission or the Council took 
faulty policy decisions in the face of the crisis. But when the crisis hit, policy makers 
were confronted with a challenge that simply could not be met within the remit of the 
existing rules: actively leaning against the wind while respecting the fiscal rules, helping 
illiquid or insolvent countries while respecting the no-bail-out clause. The main purpose 
of the Pact was precisely to avoid the notorious flaws of discretionary fiscal policy 
making by adopting a rule-based system, which, if applied fully, was believed to avert 
any form of debt crisis. 
When designing the rules in the 1990s, two key elements were overlooked or addressed 
with the (im)providence of political opportunity or both: 
• First, enforcement of the agreed set of rules for national fiscal policy making was 
essentially entrusted to the sense of responsibility for the common EU interest 
among Member States. Except for peer pressure and moral suasion at the EU 
level, the agreed set of rules does not provide for effective instrument at the EU 
level to cope with deviations from the path of virtue. The threat of a no bail out 
was assumed to prevent extreme fiscal follies. 
• Second, the designers of the SGP seem to have turned a blind eye on the fact that 
even the most sophisticated system of rules would not be able to account for all 
contingencies. As a result, the EU fiscal architecture does not have robust escape 
clauses that would kick in when the rules are objectively no longer viable. In 
addition, the flexibility introduced by the 2005 revision of the Pact was not the 
type of flexibility required to address major unforeseen events. It was flexibility 
at the margin that weakened the degree of commitment in normal or good times.  
It was just a question of time before the EU fiscal framework would run into problems: 
not effective enough in normal, and especially in good times, and too rigid in really 
difficult times such as a deep crisis. At the end, because of (i) inadequacies in auditing 
Member States’ government finances; (ii) the failure to effectively enforce its rules 
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before the crisis; and (iii) not recognising the fiscal risks implied by other macro 
imbalances, the EU was forced to resort to financial assistance, which while legally in 
line with the no bail-out clause, nevertheless implied less stringent constraints on mutual 
financial support than foreseen by the fathers of the Treaty.  
The major policy challenge going forward will thus be to rebalance the trade-off between 
commitment - a rule based system - and flexibility - escape clauses, in other words, to 
strengthen the bite of the rules under normal circumstances and increase its flexibility 
when it is most needed, notably in truly exceptional circumstances.  
By now, the need to rethink the EU's fiscal framework is commonly acknowledged. A 
number of important steps have already been taken. Some were forced by events, such as 
the adoption of the financial stability instruments on 9 May 2010, others are part of the 
official reform process, notably two Commission communications - 12 May and 30 June 
2010 - outlining options for strengthening EU economic governance, followed by a 
comprehensive package of draft EU legislation adopted by the Commission on 29 
September 2010.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of 
fiscal developments in the euro area during its first 10 years to serve as background for 
the subsequent evaluation of the Pact. Section 3 describes the major flaws of the existing 
system of governance that led to the present crisis. Section 4 discusses and presents a set 
of proposals to counter existing weaknesses. It also includes a first brief overview of the 
concrete reform proposals advanced by the European Commission on 29 September 
2010. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. THE FACTS 
The creation of the single currency in Europe is undoubtedly among the most fascinating 
experiments in modern economic history. It is unique in the sense that the monetary 
union was established prior to a strong political and fiscal union. A monetary union 
without a well-built fiscal union gives rise to major challenges, not least that of keeping 
fiscal policies in check as free-rider opportunities emerge. These are well documented 
and analysed in the literature and include the incentive to run fiscal deficits in the pursuit 
of electoral success while largely exporting the financial crowding-out effects to other 
participants in the monetary union (European Commission, 2008). 
This is precisely why the least profligate countries (led by Germany) insisted on the 
adoption of the SGP prior to the creation of the single currency, to tie the hands of the 
spendthrift peers. As is well known, the Pact commits countries to keep their fiscal 
deficits below 3% of GDP, except in exceptional circumstances, and to ensure their 
public debt levels fall to 60% of GDP or stay at or below that level. The exact 
formulation of the fiscal rules embedded in the Pact is well documented, so we will 
refrain from rehearsing them here. However, it is important to stress that the rules are 
fundamentally asymmetric: there are alarm bells and sanctions if countries breach (or fail 
to converge to) the deficit and debt "reference values", but there are no political rewards 
for doing better than this even in economic good times ("sticks without carrots"). 
The question then is how euro-area members have fared in terms of their fiscal behaviour 
since the start of the monetary union. This has already been analysed in numerous 
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contributions, but it is only now that we can assess the developments from the 
perspective of an incipient sovereign debt crisis. Before the crisis, the assessment was 
mixed to positive, but we now know that the first decade of EMU was exceptionally 
benign. The crisis changed everything.  
A quick inspection of Figure 1 to Figure 3 would make one believe that the euro-area 
wide fiscal position has been well-behaved, moving up in economic good times and 
moving down again in downturns. Also the cyclically-adjusted position looks well-
behaved, suggesting a counter-cyclical stance of fiscal policies over the business cycle 
(with the exception of 2001-2002 when several countries were led to hand out windfall 
gains from the dotcom boom amid a busy election calendar).  
But this is to deny the exceptionally favourable macroeconomic conditions that were 
prevalent in the first ten years of EMU. Much more progress with fiscal consolidation 
should have been made in that period in order to better weather the storm of the financial 
crisis that unfolded in 2008-2009. Euro-area countries have not done this collectively. 
But some did worse than others. We find it convenient to make a distinction between 
those that at least during the first full cycle (from the Asian crisis in 1998 via the dotcom 
boom in 1999-2000 to the dotcom bust in 2001-2003) did or did not make any progress 
in terms of achieving their medium-term objective of a fiscal position "close to balance 
or in surplus" as enshrined in the Pact and projected in the annual updates of their 
Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs). We call the former the "early flouters", 
which include the three largest euro-area countries along with Portugal and Greece 
(Figure 4).  
The behaviour of the "early flouters" in the period 1998-2003 is in sharp contrast with 
that of the "early compliers" (Figure 5). Prominent among those are Spain and Ireland, 
very much helped by an exceptionally tax-rich growth pattern (with fast real estate 
development squeezing exporting industries). Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium were 
also "early compliers", although less driven by real estate developments, but buoyant 
financial asset and housing markets did play a role in the case of the Netherlands as well 
while Belgium benefitted from an inversion of its debt snowball. Notably Spain and 
Ireland now look less compliant than they seemed at the time, as the exceptional 
buoyancy of asset and housing markets proved ephemeral, but they could have done 
worse nonetheless. 
Germany and France were the first countries to breach the 3% of GDP deficit limit in 
2003 and thereby also the first to become subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP). This is somewhat ironic because the Pact had been the fruit of a German 
initiative, watered down somewhat by extensive arm twisting by France. The designers 
of the Pact were thus the first to breach it. This was never the intention. It is therefore not 
surprising that both countries colluded to "put the EDP in abeyance", which eventually 
led to a revision of the Pact in 2005. It became more lenient in some respects, but it was 
hoped that by increasing the "ownership" of the Pact by the members, compliance would 
improve.   
On the face of it, however, compliance did not improve. The "early flouters" saw their 
fiscal positions improve, but again the business cycle helped and the medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTO) remained moving targets (Figure 4). The "early compliers" 
continued to behave, at least apparently for a while, until the financial crisis broke out 
 
 
 
8 
and their overblown real estate and financial activities melted down (Figure 5). The same 
happened among the "early flouters", but here the contrast with their past performance is 
less stark. Now that budget deficits have soared across the board, all countries still 
promise to respect their MTO, as depicted in the figures. Are these promises credible? 
Perhaps they are as financial markets now kick in, that is, exert a strong pressure on 
domestic fiscal policy makers (see below). 
The 60% of GDP reference value for public debt has traditionally received somewhat 
less attention than the deficit criterion. This has clearly changed since the financial 
rescues in the wake of the crisis led to massive increases in public indebtedness. Before 
the crisis, the "early flouters" routinely promised to reduce their debt ratios in their SCPs 
and also routinely failed to achieve this (except initially Italy, helped by low interest 
rates interacting with a high initial debt level; see Figure 6). The "early compliers" did 
achieve a secular decline in their debt-to-GDP ratios, but were all severely hit by the 
financial crisis, which led to an abrupt reversal of this tendency (Figure 7). 
What role have financial markets plaid in this saga as a signalling device concerning 
national debt imbalances? One of the basic assumptions underpinning the SGP is that 
financial markets in a monetary union will not differentiate sufficiently between 
countries in terms of their sovereign risk while the exchange rate risk has been removed 
altogether. If financial markets fail to discipline countries through these channels, 
something will need to do it for them. This was the Pact supposed to do. For quite some 
time the market failure premise seemed to be correct: cross-country differences in fiscal 
performance were significant, yet this was not reflected in sovereign risk premiums 
(Figure 8). The standard explanation was that bond markets had integrated and risk 
premiums had been arbitraged away.  
We now know better. In fact, the "Great Moderation" rhetoric along with the liquidity 
glut stemming from the US-Chinese external imbalance produced a hunt for yield and an 
underestimation of risk. Arbitrage surely occurred, but was not driven so much by 
"financial integration" per se, but rather by excessive liquidity in financial markets. This, 
of course, suddenly changed with the financial crisis when underlying sovereign risk 
differentials were at last revealed. The fiscal consolidation need facing euro-area 
countries, like that of their peers elsewhere in the developed world, is daunting. Can the 
existing set of fiscal rules deliver this? Or are modifications needed? What severely 
complicates the issue is that not only fiscal consolidation is needed, but also markets 
have become quite nervous about the euro area's aptitude to deliver this and to rescue a 
Member State that threatens to sink – as the Greek example has shown. A crisis 
resolution scheme is well underway, but it is still not clear whether this will be a 
permanent feature of EMU governance and even less clear if governments can muster the 
political will to restore their public finances on a permanent basis. 
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Figure 1: Fiscal position and the output gap in the EU, 1999-2011 
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Figure 2: Fiscal stance and the output gap Figure 3: Fiscal stance and the change in the output gap 
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Figure 4: Targeted and actual fiscal positions: the "early flouters" 
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Notes: The solid lines correspond to actual numbers (based 
on the European Commission Spring Forecast 2010) and the 
dashed lines to the respective (updates) of the Stability 
Programmes of year t/t+1. The horizontal line represents the 
Maastricht reference value (3% of GDP) and the shaded area 
an Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Source: European Commission 
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Figure 5: Targeted and actual fiscal positions: the "early compliants" 
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Notes: The solid lines correspond to actual numbers (based on 
the European Commission Spring Forecast 2010) and the 
dashed lines to the respective (updates) of the Stability 
Programmes of year t/t+1. The horizontal line represents the 
Maastricht reference value (3% of GDP) and the shaded area 
an Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
 
Source: European Commission 
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Figure 6: Targeted and actual public debt positions: the "early flouters" 
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Notes: The solid lines correspond to actual numbers (based on the 
European Commission Spring Forecast 2010) and the dashed lines to 
the respective (updates) of the Stability Programmes of year t/t+1. 
The horizontal line represents the Maastricht reference value (60% of 
GDP) and the shaded area an Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
 
Source: European Commission 
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Figure 7: Targeted and actual public debt positions: the "early compliers" 
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European Commission Spring Forecast 2010) and the dashed lines to 
the respective (updates) of the Stability Programmes of year t/t+1. The 
horizontal line represents the Maastricht reference value (60% of GDP) 
and the shaded area an Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
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Figure 8: Fiscal deficit and sovereign yield spreads 
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3. THE FLAWS 
The SGP has attracted scepticism and criticism from the very beginning, even before it 
entered into force. Especially academic commentators have argued that, although well-
intentioned and addressing relevant issues, its specific design was off-the mark or too 
strict or both. Prominent examples of early critical views of this kind are Buiter et al. 
(1993) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), who were followed by a veritable 
avalanche of judgemental contributions once the SGP had become effective, in particular 
shortly before and after November 2003 when the Council decided not to follow the 
provisions of the Pact in relation to the EDP for France and Germany.1  
In spite of such persistent, primarily academic, scepticism, partly and understandably 
fuelled by the novelty and uniqueness of the experiment, a broad-based consensus had 
formed whereby, even if not perfect, the SGP had, after all, contributed to fiscal 
prudence, in particular compared to the late 1980s and early 1990s when some EU 
Member States had been running two-digit budget deficit-to-GDP ratios. In the two years 
preceding the Great Recession, public finance developments seemed to vindicate this 
assessment.  
Many Member States could have made greater fiscal efforts, not least because economic 
conditions were favourable and economic growth particularly tax rich. This point was 
repeatedly brought home by the European Commission, see for instance European 
Commission (2007) and (2008a). But then, based on information available in real time, 
most EU countries appeared to have reached or were close to reaching their MTO. There 
were isolated concerns relating to the sustainability of revenue and expenditure growth in 
countries like Spain or Ireland.2 On the whole, however, everything looked fine. When 
the first ten years of the euro area were celebrated, there was a general feeling of the euro 
being a success, although requests were made for stricter fiscal discipline and concerns 
were raised about growing imbalances between countries sharing the single European 
currency.3  
The present crisis has completely altered the predominant assessment of the SGP. At the 
time of writing, there are very few, if any, observers who would still see no major 
shortcomings in the EU fiscal surveillance framework. The prevailing diagnosis 
encompasses several flaws, some of which were apparent and a source of concern prior 
to the crisis, other were more difficult to anticipate  
3.1. Flaw Nr. 1: weak statistical surveillance 
Reliable, complete and timely public finance data are essential for the success of any 
rule-based system of fiscal surveillance. This was clear from the very beginning of the 
process leading to the SGP and is reflected in specific provisions laid out in secondary 
EU legislation.4 These provisions detail a series of obligations regarding the reporting of 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive review of the debate on the SGP see Jonung et al (2008). 
2 See for instance Martinez-Mongay et al (2005). 
3 See for instance the assessment in European Commission (2008b) or Buti et al. (2010) for a general 
review of the first decade of the euro.  
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, amended by 
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government data by the Member States such as the type of information, the quality of 
data, the frequency of reporting and the interaction between the Member States' 
statistical offices and the European Commission as represented by Eurostat. 
With the benefit of hindsight, we know now that the existing provisions concerning the 
reporting and assessment of government statistics relevant for fiscal surveillance did not 
guarantee the necessary quality of data across all countries. Minor reporting issues came 
into view in many countries, but it was the case of Greece which highlighted the limits of 
a system that essentially trusts the capacity and willingness of national authorities to 
provide complete, reliable and timely government accounts. The long series of major 
revisions of Greek government data was certainly not the sole cause of the 2010 
sovereign debt crisis, but they revealed how the domestic authorities for a long time had 
been masking the true extent of the fiscal imbalances and, as a consequence, had been 
delaying appropriate actions. 5 
The provisions on statistical reporting related to fiscal surveillance - Council regulation 
No. 3605/93 and its successive amendments – give the possibility to carry out so-called 
methodological visits to Member States 'in cases where substantial risks or potential 
problems with the quality of data are identified’; and this possibility was used in 
practice. However, the provisions did not allow for an effective and comprehensive 
auditing.  
At the end of the day, the European Commission had to rely on the readiness of national 
authorities to provide accurate data and, if prompted, to provide access to information 
necessary to ultimately check the quality and reliability of national accounts. In most 
cases, and for most countries, this principle of trust and voluntariness worked reasonably 
well. Nevertheless, the crisis revealed that the cases of non-compliance were serious 
enough to question the existing statistical reporting and data monitoring as a whole. 
3.2. Flaw Nr. 2: the (non)preventive arm of the Pact in good times 
As fiscal imbalances are taken to threaten macroeconomic stability in the EMU, the main 
objective of the SGP is to ensure sound public finances in the Member States. To this end 
two main instruments are available: the preventive and the corrective arm of the Pact.  
The preventive arm endeavours to avert excessive deficits. Under the provisions of the 
preventive arm Member States are required to adjust their fiscal balance towards a 
medium-term budgetary position, the MTO, which would safeguard against the risk of 
breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty and ensure long-term sustainability of 
public finances. In case the preventive arm is insufficient, the corrective arm defines the 
procedures aimed at correcting excessive deficits once they occur; it also foresees 
sanctions in case excessive deficits are not corrected. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000 of 28 February 2000, Commission Regulation (EC) No 351/2002 of 
25 February 2002, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 of 12 December 2005. 
5 A detailed account of the repeated revisions of Greek government data and the underlying issues can be 
found in the Report on Greek Government Deficit and Debt Statistics released by the European 
Commission in January 2010. The report is available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/COM_2010_REPORT_GREEK/EN/COM_2010_RE
PORT_GREEK-EN.PDF . 
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In theory, the combined effect of fiscal surveillance under the preventive arm and the 
threat of sanctions included in the corrective arm should have encouraged Member States 
to run responsible fiscal policies. In practice, however, things did not work out as 
expected for a number of reasons.  
The provisions of the preventive arm turned out to be less effective and persuasive then 
planned. In particular, they did not cure one of the key pathologies of fiscal policy 
making: pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good times. As shown in the previous section, since 
the inception of the Pact in the late 1990s, several Member States went through two 
episodes of the following type: instead of accelerating fiscal adjustments during 
economic booms, revenue windfalls were used to ease fiscal policy just to find out during 
the subsequent downturn, that fiscal space had been exhausted and that government 
deficits surpassed the 3% of GDP reference value. This very pattern was observed during 
both the ICT boom-bust cycle of the late 1990s, early 2000s and in the second half of the 
2000s when a relatively strong and tax rich economic recovery ended in the Great 
Recession.  
The consistent failure of the Pact to encourage fiscal adjustment in economic good times 
originated in a combination of three factors. First, there is considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the measurement of the crucial yardstick of EU fiscal surveillance, the 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB). All fiscal requirements to be met by Member 
States under the provisions of the preventive arm are expressed and assessed net of 
cyclical conditions and net of one-off and other temporary measures, notably the annual 
benchmark adjustment towards the MTO of 0.5% of GDP, the MTO proper, and the 
minimum benchmark, that is, the maximum level of the CAB that provides a safety 
margin against breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty with normal cyclical 
fluctuations.  
In view of the large degree of uncertainty surrounding both output gap estimates and tax 
elasticities, the opportunities offered by economic good times were generally ascertained 
only when it was too late, with the benefit of hindsight. A case in point is 2007, the last 
year before the Great Recession. In autumn of that year, the Commission services 
autumn forecast estimated the CAB of the euro area at -0.7% of GDP. Based on the 
figures available at the time, most countries were considered to be close or approaching 
their respective MTO. This was the combined effect of misjudging the economy's 
position in the cycle and higher than average tax elasticities. Less then three years later 
the assessment had changed significantly. Using the nominal deficit figures of October 
2007 and applying the output gap estimates of the latest Commission forecast (Spring 
2010), the 2007 CAB declined by 2/3 of a percentage point, to -2.0 % of GDP. If this 
estimate had been available in real time, for a number of countries it would have implied 
a different – more negative - judgement about the relative position with respect to the 
MTO and possibly also with respect to the minimum benchmark.  
Second, even when risks to fiscal virtue were visible, the surveillance instruments and, 
more specifically, the instruments of peer pressure offered by the preventive arm of the 
Pact, such as the Council opinions on the SCPs or the warning (foreseen by Art. 121 of 
the Treaty), did not necessarily produce the desired results. In particular, temporarily 
throwing the spotlight of public attention onto observed or projected deviations from the 
required path of fiscal adjustment and recalling the principle of fiscal rectitude enshrined 
in the Pact at best induced Member States to adjust their plans but not their actual 
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policies. As a result, one could observe an increasing gap between fiscal projections and 
actual outcomes. Ultimately, the instruments of the preventive arm where not effective in 
shaping the behaviour of fiscal authorities; moral suasion was not sufficient. 
Third, the ultimate reason for controlling government deficits is to ensure public debt 
remains on a sustainable path. Often ridiculed as completely arbitrary, the 3% of GDP 
reference value was actually chosen because in the early 1990s, when the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed, it was the maximum deficit which, with an average growth rate of 3% 
in real terms and an inflation target of 2%, was consistent with a declining debt level. 
Over the years two complications arose: (i) average economic growth has consistently 
declined especially in the aftermath of the crisis; and (ii) stock-flow adjustments, the 
residual element of debt dynamics which over time should average close to zero, in some 
cases turned out to systematically increase the debt, while the deficit remained below the 
threshold.6 
The weaknesses of the preventive arm of the Pact came to a head already in the early 
years and eventually triggered the 2005 reform of the surveillance framework. One of the 
declared objectives of the reform was indeed to strengthen the preventive arm. The 
prevailing diagnosis at the time was that by strengthening the economic rationale of the 
Pact, including a stronger focus on government debt, Member States would feel a 
stronger ownership and, in the end, self-enforce the rules. Stronger external 
(dis)incentives were not considered, as the existing system of rules was generally found 
to be too tight. In line with this diagnosis, the 2005 reform added some economic flesh to 
the economic narrative underpinning the Pact but mostly introduced a higher degree of 
flexibility in the application of the corrective arm, a flexibility that was meant to account 
for changing economic circumstances.  
In light of the experience accumulated since the adoption of the reform in 2005, it is clear 
that the reform has not produced the intended outcome. The extra degree of flexibility, 
such as the possibility of taking into account other relevant factors when assessing the 
existence of an excessive deficit, was of limited use during the Great Recession and the 
changes to the preventive arm have not induced Member States to take advantage of the 
good times leading up to the crisis.  
3.3. Flaw Nr. 3: other macroeconomic imbalances ignored  
The architecture of the EU system of economic governance incorporates a key tenet of 
the macroeconomic paradigm that prevailed in the decades preceding the Great 
Recession. It was built on the premise that low and stable inflation (monetary stability) 
combined with sound fiscal policy (fiscal stability) were sufficient to safeguard overall 
macroeconomic stability. Imbalances other than fiscal ones where taken to be the result 
of loose monetary and/or fiscal policy, rather than constituting independent risks for 
                                                 
6 The elements in the stock flow adjustment which systematically increased debt in some countries include 
subsidies to companies outside the government sector disguised as capital transfers, or systematic 
differences between cash based-revenues und accrual based revenues (e.g. actual social contributions 
received versus due contributions) which should disappear over time but showed a suspicious degree of 
persistence in some cases. 
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policy making.7 To maintain monetary and fiscal stability, the room for discretionary 
monetary and fiscal policy actions should be limited through the establishment of 
independent central banks with the goal of price stability (low inflation) and the reliance 
on automatic fiscal stabilizers. This view was enshrined both in the ECB institutional 
framework and in the Maastricht Treaty and the ensuing SGP. 
The boom-bust dynamics leading to the Great Recession has exposed a severe weakness 
in this approach. Ever since governments and central banks in Europe, and beyond, had 
to step in massively to rescue financial institutions that had accumulated an excess of 
'bad' assets on the back of housing and asset bubbles, it has become clear that the 
sustainability of public finances requires more than 'just' keeping the fiscal house in 
order; additional policies are needed.  
The crisis has demonstrated that the sustainability of public finances can also be affected 
by economic imbalances which, in situations of economic stress and/or if they go beyond 
a certain level, risk turning into government liabilities and/or end up on the balance 
sheets of central banks. This risk became particularly evident in EU Member States 
which in the years preceding the Great Recession had been attested sound fiscal positions 
in terms of the formal requirements of the preventive dimension of EU fiscal 
surveillance, but suddenly found themselves in deep fiscal difficulties as the unwinding 
of other imbalances spilled-over to the government sector.  
The most obvious cases in point are Spain and Ireland. Both countries recorded a 
staggering swing from seemingly sound budgetary surpluses before the crisis to very 
large budget deficits in the wake of the crisis. In 2006, Ireland posted government 
revenues in excess of total expenditure of 3% of GDP, Spain of 2 % of GDP. Three years 
later, government expenditures surpassed total revenues by 14.3% of GDP and 11.2% of 
GDP respectively. At the same time government debt increased by significantly more 
than the budget deficit as a result of government interventions aimed at restoring and 
safeguarding financial stability mainly through capital injections to banks and other 
financial institutions. 8 
As became clear quickly, the dramatic deterioration of public finances in the two 
countries had gone well beyond the impact of the cycle. In view of the extent of the 
problem, fiscal authorities had to acknowledge without reservation that a significant part 
of government revenues had been linked to unsustainable developments in the housing 
market and to capital inflows mirroring large and persistent current account deficits. A 
large structural gap in government accounts had suddenly emerged due to the boom-bust 
cycle.  
In spite of the narrow focus on fiscal developments, the EU fiscal surveillance did not 
completely ignore the potential risks to public finances associated with macroeconomic 
imbalances outside the government sector. In its recommendation for a Council opinion 
                                                 
7 A succinct review of the macroeconomic paradigm dominating the years and decades prior to the Great 
Recession is provided in Blanchard et al. (2010). 
8 In the case of Ireland, government transfers to the banking sector in 2010 were recorded 'above the line' 
bringing the deficit to above 30% of GDP. These measures did not qualify as a financial transaction 
('below the line') because the receiving banks were not considered to be economically viable. 
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on the 2006/07 updates of the Spanish and Irish stability programme, the Commission 
made reference to rising external imbalances and the existing inflation differential within 
the euro area as well as to the unbalanced growth pattern which was led by strong 
housing sector developments.9  
Although the macroeconomic risks of the housing boom were broadly known, the overall 
assessment of the Spanish and the Irish fiscal positions and plans was approving, not 
least because the two countries were in full compliance with the provisions of the SGP. 
The rules did not provide for the possibility to ring the alarm bells and to deploy the 
formal instruments of peer pressure (e.g. the warning under Art. 121 of the Treaty) on the 
basis of developments outside public finances.  
3.4. Flaw Nr. 4: weak EU enforcement 
As the euro area is a monetary union without a strong fiscal union, the scope for 
effectively influencing fiscal policy making at the supranational level clashes with 
national sovereignty. The circle is formally squared by submitting the national 
prerogative of fiscal policy making to the commonly agreed rules of the SGP. The 
ultimate decision making authority in charge of implementing the rules are the Member 
States within the Council. Based on the initiatives and recommendations of the European 
Commission, the Council approves or rejects the legislative instruments which are meant 
to ensure the functioning of the Pact. Decisions are generally taken with a qualified 
majority and Member States are expected to adhere to the decisions taken.  
The two main instruments available to the Council to encourage compliance are peer 
pressure (under the preventive arm of the Pact) and the deliberation of financial sanctions 
(under the corrective arm of the Pact) if an excessive deficit persists and the Member 
States concerned repeatedly fail to comply with the recommendations and decisions of 
the Council. 
With the benefit of hindsight we know that these instruments of economic governance 
have not been sufficient to ensure compliance with the rules. The presumption 
underpinning the design of the SGP whereby Member States would follow the rules so as 
to avoid sanctions turned out to be too optimistic. Instead the Council has emerged as the 
weak link in the EU governance structure, serving rather as a gentlemen's club avoiding 
or minimizing confrontation among its members.  
While fiscal surveillance is effectively carried out by the European Commission whose 
statutory independence should ensure impartiality of its assessments; this impartiality has 
not always been visible in the final acts approved by the Council. For many years, up 
until 2006, the Commission recommendations for Council acts were not accessible to the 
general public; only the version amended and adopted by the Council was. While the 
substance of the two documents may not have differed much in most cases, the version 
                                                 
9 The full list of SCPs, the Commission assessment, the Commission recommendations for a Council 
opinion and the Council opinion proper can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/convergence/programmes/2006-07_en.htm. Explicit comments 
on the potential risks related to housing bubbles were given in research documents produced by 
Commission services. Martinez-Mongay et al. (2007), for instance, clearly pointed to the fiscal risks 
associated with the housing boom in Spain. They pointed to the large revenue ensuing from transaction 
taxes and VAT on housing and that a large part of those revenues could not be sustained indefinitely.  
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finally adopted by the Council very often included important modifications to the 
wording and sometimes also to the overall message. Typically, the Member States 
concerned by the Council act were particularly active in proposing and defending 
modifications of the Commission recommendations. In 2006, it was eventually decided 
to make the Commission recommendations public albeit only after the Council had 
amended and adopted the document. 
The authority of the Council goes beyond the redrafting of legal documents proposed by 
the European Commission. Past practice encompasses instances that clearly qualified for 
an early warning but where the Council decided not to follow up on the respective 
recommendation of the European Commission and to close the procedure. This was, for 
instance, the case for Italy in April 2004.10 The Council's decision was typically based on 
a commitment by the country concerned to correct fiscal developments. Unfortunately, 
such commitments were not always honoured and/or the reasons or responsibilities for 
not delivering (bad luck or lack of effort) became an issue of contention.  
This is not to say that the Council repeatedly acted in conflict with the Pact.11 Rather, the 
point to be stressed here are the type of problems that ensue from an architecture of fiscal 
surveillance that lacks effective enforcement mechanisms, as Member States remain de 
facto fiscally sovereign.  
Conceptually, the problem can be framed in terms of what in the literature is called a 
public goods game: there is an incentive to free ride on fiscal sustainability, if 
sustainability is provided by others, while it is optimal to contribute to fiscal 
sustainability if it is not provided by others. In this game, the SGP represents the set of 
rules that should make sure the players don't give in to the temptation to believe that 
whatever they do, others will provide the public good, in the extreme case including a 
bail-out. 
The Commission, is entrusted with monitoring compliance with the requirements of the 
Pact but apart from moral suasion has no enforcement power, neither has the group of 
countries which at the end of the day has to trust the willingness of its individual 
members to abide by the rules. Formally, the group can, with a majority decision, agree 
to proceed against a non-compliant member. However, blocking coalitions can easily be 
formed.  
 
3.5. Flaw Nr. 5: lacking provisions for mitigation of severe economic stress  
One of the pillars of modern macroeconomic policy thinking is the notion that in order to 
ensure macroeconomic stability policy makers should be guided by rules rather than 
                                                 
10 The council decision to close the early warning recommended by the Commission is available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/81342.pdf#page=9  
11 It did so once in November 2003, but in relation to the implementation of the corrective arm of the Pact. 
The Council decided not to adopt the Commission recommendations under Article 104(9) for Germany 
and France and to adopt its own conclusions instead. The Commission brought the case before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, which on 13 July 2004 annulled the Council conclusions in so far as 
they aimed at formally suspending the excessive deficit procedure and modifying the existing 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
22 
discretion. This view emerged inter alia from the unflattering experience of the 1970s 
and 1980s that saw an accumulation of unsustainable government deficits and debt 
levels. In addition, there is little evidence that with normal cyclical fluctuations 
discretionary fiscal policy provided any significant contribution to economic 
stabilization: (i) its effect on output is limited or uncertain, (ii) it is slow-moving as it 
requires a considerable amount of time to be activated; (iii) it may interfere with the 
stabilisation objective of monetary policy making; and (iv) discretionary fiscal policy 
measures may be motivated by goals other than economic stabilisation.12 
The rule-based system of fiscal surveillance codified in the SGP essentially builds on the 
orthodox scepticism vis-à-vis fiscal discretion. Under the provisions of the Pact, the 
stabilisation function is entrusted to automatic fiscal stabilisers and fiscal discretion is to 
be used for the purpose of fiscal consolidation only, unless a country has more than 
achieved its MTO, which in practice did not happen very often.  
The crisis undermined the restrictions on discretionary fiscal stabilisation. In the face of 
an alarming contraction of economic activity, the working of automatic stabilisers was 
soon considered to be insufficient to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Confronted with 
the choice of remaining faithful to the rules of the EU fiscal framework or leaning 
against the severe and unprecedented economic downturn, priority was eventually given 
to the latter. In its European Economic Recovery Programme (EERP), adopted at the end 
of 2008 and subsequently endorsed by the Council, the Commission encouraged Member 
States, including those that had not reach the MTO yet, meaning the vast majority of 
Member States, to ease fiscal policy in a timely, targeted and temporary fashion. At the 
same time, and in line with its legal obligations, the Commission decided to apply the 
provisions of the corrective arm of the Pact, notably to open EDPs for all countries with a 
deficit in excess of 3% of GDP; as of 2009 this was the case for almost all EU Member 
States, also and in particular on account of the fiscal stimulus packages encouraged by 
the EERP.  
The degree of flexibility provided by the Pact for assessing the existence of an excessive 
deficit, which include the possibility of a waiver in the event of a serve economic 
downturn,13 were too tight to encompass the budgetary repercussions of the Great 
Recession. Based on the prevailing interpretation of the Pact, a deficit of more than 3% 
of GDP may not be considered excessive if and only if it is stays close to the threshold. 
In most countries, the excess of the government deficit over the 3% of GDP threshold of 
the Treaty was far too large in 2009 and 2010 to draw on this provision. 
Even the additional degrees of flexibility introduced with the 2005 reform of the SGP 
were of limited use in the crisis. They provide for more judgement in the assessment of 
compliance and for the possibility to stretch the length of procedural steps of the EDP or 
to repeat them depending on economic circumstances.14 As a result, during the crisis the 
Commission was in a position to define sufficiently long adjustment paths so as to 
account for the exceptional depth of the crisis. However, in several cases this margin of 
                                                 
12 For a comprehensive discussion see for instance Taylor (2000). 
13 Council regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005. 
14 For a detailed review of the 2005 reform of the SGP see European Commission (2006). 
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flexibility was applied to excessive deficits that inter alia had resulted from a concerted 
violation of the rules.  
Undoubtedly, the forced combination of accepting violations of the Pact on the one hand 
and insisting on the formal, although more flexible implementation of the EDP, on the 
other has not strengthened the already battered credibility of the surveillance framework. 
At the same time it is fair to say that alternative courses of action were not necessarily 
more attractive. On the contrary, if, in the face of the Great Recession, the Commission 
had stubbornly insisted on the strict application of the Pact, including the ban of 
discretionary fiscal expansions, a severe confrontation with the Member States within the 
Council would have been very likely. With monetary policy constrained by the zero 
bound of nominal interest rates, discretionary expansions were the sole instrument left in 
the tool box of economic policy makers. In the face of the worst economic downturn in 
the post-war period fiscal inactivity was not an option from a political point of view and 
probably irresponsible in view of the risk of a systemic economic meltdown. 
Ultimately, this episode brings to the fore an important, although not new, insight 
concerning the design of rule-based policy frameworks. In view of the inherent 
uncertainty of economic development, there will always be major unforeseen adverse 
events. From a practical point of view this means that it will be impossible to conceive a 
rules-based framework that ex ante accounts for all possible states of the world; 
contingent flexibility is required.  
The credibility and sustainability of a rules-based framework depends on whether it 
includes robust escape clauses that allow policy makers to cope with particularly adverse 
circumstances when sticking to the rules is no longer viable.15 Once the adverse shock, 
like an extreme crisis, has been dealt with, and normal circumstances prevail, a return to 
the rules can take place. Escaping temporarily and in a pre-designed way from the rules 
is thus a method to maintain a rule-based framework in the long run.  
3.6 Flaw Nr. 6: lacking provisions for sovereign debt default  
The Great Recession has revealed the drawbacks of the lack of crisis resolution 
mechanisms. As the sovereign debt crisis escalated in Greece, the conclusion was drawn 
that an uncontrolled default should be avoided in the interest of financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole; but no instrument was at hand. As a result, a lengthy and, at times, 
painful search for an ad hoc solution took place which ended in an agreement that 
foresaw intergovernmental loans from euro area countries and a contribution from the 
IMF. There was of course a discussion about whether financial support to Greece by 
other euro-area members would violate the no-bail-out clause of the Treaty (Art. 125). 
But this issue was soon put aside.  
Had Greece been outside the euro area, financial assistance from the EU could have been 
brokered through the provisions of Art. 143 of the Treaty, as was for instance the case for 
                                                 
15 Our plea for an escape clause in a rule based system is similar to the analysis of the gold standard as a 
contingent rule. Under exceptional circumstances, countries could leave the gold standard, and return back 
without losing credibility. The escape clause actually fostered the credibility of the gold standard as long as 
expectations of a rule based policy in normal times were maintained. See for example Bordo and Schwartz 
(1998) and Bordo and Kydland (1996).  
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Hungary in 2008 or Romania in 2009. However, for countries adopting the single 
currency, the Treaty does not provide such an option. The SGP was built on the 
assumption that fiscal surveillance would work and, thus, that no crisis resolution would 
be necessary. The no-bail-out clause was part of this thinking. It was supposed to act as a 
powerful disincentive against the temptations of moral hazard. As we know now, things 
turned out differently. 
The ad hoc package for Greece in the spring of 2010 did not calm markets for long. 
Shortly after the Greek government had agreed on an adjustment programme with the 
Commission and the IMF, pressure in sovereign debt markets started mounting again, 
this time involving also Portugal and Spain. In an emergency meeting held on 9 May 
2010 the Ecofin Council adopted the blueprint of a temporary but more general rescue 
mechanism – the European Financial Stabilisation mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) - aimed at providing help to euro area countries that 
run into financial trouble.16  
As the recent debt crisis in the euro area unfolded, policy makers - instead of relying on a 
formal institutional set-up - were forced to improvise. The 'no-assistance' principle of the 
SGP, whereby fiscal sovereignty was expected to apply also in times of crises, including 
the possibility of default, turned out not to be credible in extreme circumstances.  
Although a formidable sign of solidarity, the decision to go to Greece's rescue was not 
completely altruistic. It originated in the understanding that with an integrated financial 
market, the default of one sovereign debtor, even of a relatively small one measured in 
terms of the share in euro-area GDP, can have serious repercussions via contagion for the 
rest of the euro area, both via the confidence channel and the more mundane bank 
balance sheet channel - the latter being particularly dangerous in view of the dire state of 
the banking sector.  
The crisis also showed how uncertainty about the 'end game', arrangements for handling 
cases of sovereign illiquidity or insolvency, would fuel worries among financial market 
participants and significantly amplify risk aversion towards sovereign debt of countries 
with still liquid yet strained public finances.  
Finally, the lack of crisis resolution mechanism has also weighed on the ECB's 
independence. The monetary authority of the euro area was basically 'forced' by events to 
engage in non-orthodox monetary policy measures to safeguard the stability of the 
financial systems, at the risk of potentially jeopardising its statutory objective of price 
stability and erasing the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy, so important for 
the credibility of the ECB.17 
                                                 
16 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf 
17 In mid-May 2010, amid renewed tensions in the financial systems of some euro-area Member States and 
following the ECOFIN council meeting of 9/10 May 2010, the ECB started buying government bonds of 
troubled EU countries on the secondary market. While the quantities involved are relatively minor 
compared to the ECB's overall balance sheet and the central bank announced that the purchase of 
government bonds would be sterilised, observers worried that this move would eventually undermine 
policies aimed at price stability and reward fiscally irresponsible Member States. 
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 3.7. Flaw Nr. 7: fiscal consolidation and structural reform seen as substitutes 
rather than complements 
In the policy debate, fiscal obligations under the SGP are often portrayed as obstacles to 
structural reforms. The narrative underlying this view is that fiscal rules imposing annual 
ceilings on the government deficit and/or debt ratio may give undue priority to short-run 
fiscal discipline at the cost of long-run economic growth and, possibly, long-run fiscal 
sustainability. Among the first studies following this line of criticism were Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1998), Razin and Sadka (2002) and Beetsma and Debrun (2005).  
The key premise connecting these and similar studies is simple: beneficial economic 
reforms are put off because of their short-term budgetary costs which entail the risk of 
breaching existing fiscal thresholds. As a result, economic growth prospects are 
weakened, as is, in turn, the long-term sustainability of public finances.  
Essentially the same reasoning was vented in the context of the reform process which 
eventually led to the revision of the SGP in 2005. The idea gained ground among policy 
makers that in order to enhance the growth oriented nature of the Pact, provisions should 
be made more flexible so as to account for the short-term costs of structural reforms. This 
thinking eventually found its reflection in the revised SGP that entered into force in 
2005. Since then, countries implementing major structural reform are allowed to 
temporarily deviate from the required path of fiscal adjustment. In addition, special 
provisions apply to pensions reforms introducing a fully funded pillar. The costs of the 
reform to the publicly managed pillar are considered when assessing deficit figures under 
both the preventive and the corrective arm of the Pact.  
Contrary to the predictions of those who considered the SGP as an obstacle, the 
flexibility introduced with the 2005 revision of the EU fiscal surveillance framework did 
not spur the reform effort of the EU Member States. The pace of implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy - the original name of the EU reform programme set up by the European 
Council in March 2000 with the aim of turning the European Union into “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" – has remained 
sluggish. One year after the 2005 mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy, Pisany-Ferry 
and Sapir (2006) concluded that the results of the reform programme had been at best 
mixed. A similar conclusion is reached by Alesina et al (2008). They acknowledge an 
acceleration of the pace of structural reform in the product markets since 1997, but do 
not see any major advancement in the area of labour markets. In a more recent 
assessment, van Pottelsberghe (2009) argued that, at most, limited progress had been 
achieved, but nothing significant compared to the original objectives of the strategy.  
Interestingly, these assessments do not indicate the SGP rules as the culprit for the 
implementation gap. Rather, the implementation gap of the reform agenda is mostly, if 
not exclusively, associated with governance issues. As a matter of fact, the Lisbon 
Strategy did not rely on hard instruments of co-ordination and enforcement. It was 
embedded in the basic economic policy coordination mechanisms of the EU whereby, at 
the end of the day, decisions are taken by the Member States within the Council on the 
initiative of the Commission. The only enforcement instruments available are moral 
suasion and peer pressure. 
 
 
 
26 
Blaming governance may sound like the generic and unrefined complaint which these 
days is used for any kind of weakness of EU policy making. In relation to the structural 
reform fatigue, however, it touches on a pertinent and more profound issue. As 
eloquently stressed by Ioannou et al. (2008), the sluggish pace of structural reform in the 
EU is a reflection of a more general resistance that has been acknowledged and 
extensively examined in the political economy literature well before the SGP came into 
being. A whole spectrum of convincing explanations exists of why structural reforms are 
resisted or at best delayed.18 Leaving aside the idiosyncrasies of these alternative 
explanations, they all share one common conclusion: reforms are very slow to materialise 
because of the difficulty of most democratic governance structures to reconcile 
heterogeneous and conflicting interests associated with the expected impact of reforms, 
be it within a given state or, as is the case in the EU, across a community of states. The 
only element that is consistently found to spur reforms is crises: they amplify the sense of 
urgency and/or boost the costs of non-reform accumulated through persistent 
procrastination. 
Hence, the mixed track record of structural reforms in the EU and in the euro area is very 
likely to have materialised also in a counterfactual scenario without SGP in place. 
Evidence corroborating this view, and defying the assumption that reforms are inhibited 
by annual budget ceilings, is provided in European Commission (2006). On the basis of a 
comprehensive analysis of actual structural reforms in the EU between the 1970s and the 
early 2000s, it is shown that, apart from systemic pension reforms, the budgetary position 
of a country did, on average, not deteriorate in years following the implementation of 
structural reform packages. Thus, the main enemy of structural reform are not fiscal 
rules. It is the pervasive political constraints in modern democracies, sometimes denoted 
as “Juncker’s curse” (“We all know what to do, but we don’t know how to get re-elected 
once we have done it”). But in fact Juncker’s curse itself is to some extent a myth, 
something politicians believe in, but which can be empirically shown to be misguided to 
some extent (see Buti et al, 2009 and 2010).  
4. THE REMEDIES 
Crises are catalysts of reform and change – they initiate a process of policy learning. This 
is also true for the Great Recession. In its wake an intensive debate started in both the 
political and the academic arena on how to redress the shortcomings found in the 
economic and financial system that may have caused the crisis and contributed to its fast 
and extensive propagation. This debate also encompasses the role of fiscal policy and, in 
the European context, the role of EU fiscal surveillance in a monetary union. It has 
delivered a wide range of proposals some of which are more limited in scope, addressing 
some of the weaknesses described in the previous sections, others are more 
comprehensive advancing more fare-reaching plans of reform.19 
Amid this intensive debate, the Commission, exerting its right of initiative, has put 
forward a blueprint aimed at strengthening economic governance in the EU. A first 
communication outlining the main thrust of its view was released on 12 May 2010, 
followed by a second communication presenting concrete reform proposals on 30 June 
                                                 
18 A comprehensive review of the relevant literature can be found in Drazen (2000). 
19 See for example the proposals in Baldwin and Gros (2010). 
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2010.20 Concrete legislative proposals implementing the ideas presented in the two 
Communications were adopted by the Commission on 29 September 2010. Alongside the 
Commission's initiative, the European Council, in its meeting of 25/26 March 2010, 
created its own Task Force on economic governance which has been discussing various 
reform options including on the basis of proposals put forward by the Commission. The 
final report of the Task Force, released on 18 October 2010, broadly overlaps with the 
legislative proposals. Where they exist, difference, largely relate to implementation.21 
This section reviews the debate concerning the future of the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. On top of our own assessments and ideas, it outlines the official proposals 
advanced at the EU level. The discussion and presentation is organised around the issues 
discussed in the previous section. We start with ways to improve the quality of 
government finance statistics, move on to ideas on how to strengthen the preventive arm 
of the Pact and finally discuss proposals to complement the Pact with provisions for 
major unforeseen adverse events. In order to provide a complete panorama of the debate, 
each thematic section includes, where appropriate, short boxes presenting the proposals 
advanced by the Commission.  
4.1. Remedy Nr. 1: more reliable government finance statistics 
A most embarrassing element in the prologue to the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010 
was the persisting difficulty of the national authorities to report reliable government 
finance statistics coupled with the limited auditing powers of the European Commission. 
As a result, and following further major data revisions concerning the Greek fiscal 
position at the end of 2009, attention and efforts quickly focused on ways to improve the 
quality of government finance statistics in particular by enhancing Eurostat's access to 
information required to effectively verify compliance with existing rules. According to 
existing provisions there is no general obligation for Member States to provide Eurostat 
with access to all the information requested for the purposes of assessing data quality.  
 
On 12 February 2010, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council regulation 
aimed at strengthening the monitoring mechanism in the context of the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework.22 The main thrust of the proposal consists in intensifying the 
cooperation between the Commission and the Member States first by means of more 
frequent and more comprehensive statistical visits (in the context of the standard EDP 
procedure and whenever a risk assessment identifies specific and significant problems), 
and second by providing the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information 
requested for the needs of the data quality assessment. More details about the amended 
regulation are provided in Box 1. 
 
Box 1: The quality of statistical data in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
Following a recommendation by the Commission of 12 February 2010, the Council has adopted a new 
regulation on 26 July 2010 on the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit 
                                                 
20 The Commission communications are available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/2010-05-12-com(2010)250_final.pdf, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/2010-06-30-
enhancing_economic_policy_coordination_en.htm.  
21 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf  
22 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0053:FIN:EN:PDF . 
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procedure.23 The primary aim of this regulation is to strengthen data monitoring mechanisms in the context 
of EU fiscal surveillance. To this end the new piece of legislation proposes to  
(i) give Eurostat the right to access public accounts in case there are substantial doubts about the reliability 
of the statistical data submitted by a national statistical authority; "Access means the opportunity of 
consulting any relevant document by receiving a copy of it or on the spot, including, where available, an 
electronic copy, and of being provided any relevant information. The documents and information 
requested shall be provided promptly and, where available, be readily extractable from available records 
or sources" 
(ii) oblige national authorities to make available all of the relevant sources of information: "Member States 
shall as promptly as possible provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information 
requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, including statistical information such as data from 
national accounts, inventories, excessive deficit procedure notification tables, additional questionnaires 
and clarification related to the notifications." 
(iii) ensure from Member States assistance of experts in national accounting: "Member States shall, at the 
request of the Commission (Eurostat), provide the assistance of experts in national accounting, including 
for the preparation and undertaking of the methodological visits. In the exercise of their duties, these 
experts shall provide an independent expertise. A list of those experts in national accounting shall be 
constituted on the basis of proposals sent to the Commission (Eurostat) by the national authorities 
responsible for the excessive deficit reporting." 
 
Although there is a consensus among European lawmakers and governments about the 
need to improve the reliability of government finance statistics, Member States have 
shown some resistance in conceding additional power to the Commission. The 
amendments advanced by the Council to the Commission proposal seek to tighten the 
conditions under which more frequent and more comprehensive statistical visits are 
expected to be carried out.  
 
The Council's reservation with respect to a stronger monitoring power of the 
Commission is somewhat surprising against the backdrop of the Greek experience, but 
does not come as a complete surprise. It reflects the inherent tension in the current 
institutional architecture where national fiscal sovereignty is jealously defended.  
 
Taking for granted the fiscal authorities' shyness to provide 'outsiders' full and 
unconditional access to its books, a key question is whether one can think of incentive 
mechanisms that would encourage more openness. One possibility would be to require 
rating agencies to make their ratings of EU sovereign debt conditional on certain auditing 
standards. Member States would not be obliged to undergo an auditing process, but 
would have an incentive to allow auditing in order to benefit from higher ratings and, in 
turn, lower interest rates. Ideally, the auditing of Member States would be carried out by 
Eurostat who would make the results of the auditing public. 
4.2. Remedy Nr. 2: making the preventive arm more effective 
The repeated failure to effectively detect and take advantage of economic good times is 
one of the main challenges for EU fiscal surveillance. Attempts were made to reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding real-time CAB estimates, the key indicators in EU fiscal 
surveillance, or to qualify them with complementary information.24 However, in spite of 
                                                 
23 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:198:0001:0004:EN:PDF  
24 See Larch and Turrini (2010) for a detailed account of the use of the CAB in the EU fiscal surveillance. 
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measurable improvements important insights about the underlying fiscal situation and 
their risks have continued to reveal themselves only in retrospect.  
Some commentators are rather sceptical as to whether improvements in fiscal monitoring 
would actually make a difference for fiscal performance in the EU. They believe that 
even the most perfect system of surveillance spotting the actual fiscal stance in real time 
would not solve the more fundamental problem of enforcement whereby, in a system of 
fiscally sovereign Member States, sanctions cannot be really imposed at the EU level on 
democratically elected governments. According to this line of thinking, fiscal discipline 
should rather be achieved by building institutions at national level that impose effective 
constraints on the budgetary process (see for instance Wyplosz, 2010).  
Other commentators are somewhat more positive about the impact of a better and more 
effective scrutiny of EU governments' fiscal policy. In their view, the failure of the SGP 
to spot and denounce breaches of the rules was due to a lack of transparency in the 
surveillance process and insufficient impartiality on the side of the institutions that are in 
charge of surveillance. The cure they prescribe is an institutional reform that ensures a 
more objective evaluation of national budgets. Ideally, this could be achieved by 
strengthening the EU level's competencies in fiscal policy making vis-à-vis national 
fiscal authorities. However, since the appetite for devolving fiscal sovereignty is 
understood to be fairly small, they generally argue in favour of creating independent, 
extra-national institutions that would guarantee transparency and impartiality (see for 
instance Burda and Gerlach, 2010 or Fatas and Mihov, 2010, and Bofinger and Ried, 
2010). 
Our view of what an effective assessment of national fiscal policy making can achieve 
within the current architecture of EU fiscal surveillance is more nuanced. We believe 
that, leaving aside the issue of enforcement, fiscal surveillance can be significantly 
improved if current instruments are complemented by plain operational guidance on the 
yearly conduct of prudent fiscal policy making. 
A promising candidate for such guidance is a simple rule that builds upon the main 
intuition underlying the notion of fiscal sustainability, namely that over the long term 
government expenditure cannot grow faster than available government revenues. 
Keeping in mind that, under unchanged tax policies, government revenues grosso modo 
keep pace with GDP over the medium and long run, the main problem of planning, 
conducting and monitoring prudent fiscal policy, boils down to keeping an eye on 
expenditure growth compared to medium-term economic growth.25 
Anchoring expenditure to an estimate of medium-term GDP growth does not rule out 
discretionary fiscal policy or changes in the size of government. It simply means that to 
preserve sustainability discretionary expenditure increases that exceed medium-term 
                                                 
25 A simplified version of this intuition can be illustrated by taking the derivative of the budget balance to 
GDP ratio with respect to time 
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GDP growth will have to be matched by discretionary tax increases. This truism is 
supposed to clarify that an expenditure-rule based surveillance would not constrict fiscal 
policy making compared to current practice. Rather, it would provide a more practical 
reference for assessing fiscal policy of the EU Member States. 26 
The main benefits of a surveillance approach centred on a simple rule of prudent fiscal 
policy making vis-à-vis the one based on the CAB are straightforward. The simple rule 
can get by without unobservable variables, such as the output gap: both expenditure and 
GDP are observable and available in a timely fashion. For instance, one possible and 
useful benchmark for anchoring current expenditure growth is past average GDP growth. 
Moreover, coupling expenditure growth to an estimate of medium-term economic growth 
safeguards automatic stabilisation over the cycle: outlays are kept on a sustainable path 
while revenues fluctuate with economic activity and its tax content.  
Finally, a surveillance based on basic principles of prudent fiscal policy making would 
encourage and/or bolster national fiscal rules, elements of fiscal governance the 
Commission has been peddling for years. The only practical, yet manageable difficulty of 
an expenditure-rule-based surveillance is to abstract from price developments as the 
volatility of prices would add noise to the expenditure rule. In other words, expenditure 
growth should be benchmarked to the rate of real GDP growth. A 
quantification/assessment of the potential benefits of an expenditure-rule based 
surveillance is provided in the Annex. 
Box 2: Effective enforcement of economic surveillance 
To increase the credibility and the effectiveness of the EU fiscal surveillance framework, the Commission 
communication of 30 June 2010 on Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs 
– Tools for stronger EU economic governance and the ensuing legislative proposals adopted by the 
Commission on 29 September 2010 envisage a number of new elements to enhance fiscal discipline in the 
EU Member States. 
(i) Paying greater attention to expenditure and debt developments. 
Weary of the weaknesses of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance as a surveillance tool, the Commission 
suggests assessing fiscal adjustment on the basis of a simple rule very close to the one discussed above. 
According to this rule, the annual increase of government expenditure, in conjunction with discretionary 
revenue measures, should not exceed a prudent rate of medium-term economic growth that safeguards a 
country’s MTO or an appropriate adjustment path towards it. 
Although on the same footing as the deficit criterion, the debt criterion foreseen by the Treaty has never 
been used in the past. All surveillance procedures were opened and controlled on the basis of the deficit. 
To better allow for the interplay between the deficit and the debt the Commission proposes to have a 
numerical benchmark of a sufficiently diminishing debt ratio. Specifically, a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% 
would be considered sufficiently diminishing if it its distance with respect to the 60% of GDP reference 
value has reduced over the previous three years at a rate of the order of one-twentieth per year. Non-
compliance with this benchmark would not automatically bear procedural consequences. An overall 
                                                 
26 From a conceptual point of view, the expenditure aggregate for which growth should be benchmarked is 
current primary expenditure. Interest expenditures are not directly under the control of government. They 
are determined by existing debt levels and changes in interest rates. Capital expenditure, especially 
investment expenditure, can be subject to large annual fluctuations depending on the type and size of 
projects that are deliberated by the government. Current primary expenditure, by contrast, largely results 
from entitlements geared towards different parts of the population; keeping its growth rate reasonably 
steady should not pose major technical or legal problems. 
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assessment of relevant factors would follow taking into account economic conditions, the structure of the 
debt, implicit liabilities related to ageing. 
(ii) More effective enforcement instruments, i.e. sanctions/disincentives. 
The legislative package of 29 September 2010 foresees a series of graduated sanctions/disincentives to be 
applied in the successive steps of EU surveillance. Under the preventive arm of the SGP, where peer 
pressure is currently the only enforcement tool, the Commission proposes the imposition of an interest-
bearing deposit in case a euro-area Member State is making insufficient progress with budgetary 
consolidation. The interest-bearing deposit would be imposed in case a Member States significantly and 
persistently deviated from the principles of prudent fiscal-policy making.  
Additional sanctions/disincentives are proposed for the successive stages of the excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP) starting with a non-interest bearing deposit when the Council decides that an excessive deficit 
exists, followed by a fine when the Council decides a Member State has not taken effective action to 
correct the excessive deficit.  
Importantly, all new sanctions/disincentives are planned to become effective semi-automatically, that is 
once the relevant fiscal circumstances have been formally established, unless the Council finds a majority 
against it. Due to legal limitations, combined with the fact that countries sharing the single European 
currency share a larger degree of common responsibilities, the new sanctions would apply to euro-area 
countries only. 
Undoubtedly, the semi-automatic nature of the proposed sanctions/disincentives would constitute a major 
innovation. So far, and especially when negotiating the SGP in the second half of the 1990s, there has 
always been a strong opposition to automatic sanctions, and to automaticity in general. The 1997 
resolution of Amsterdam, by which Member States committed to a strict and timely implementation of the 
SGP was, in fact, meant to reassure those Member States (primarily Germany) which had feared that a 
rules-based system could conceivably work only if political discretion was reduced to a minimum (see 
Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). With the benefit of hindsight, those fears were justified.  
4.3. Remedy Nr. 3: broader economic surveillance 
Defying the main premise of macroeconomic thinking that had emerged from the 'Great 
moderation', low and stable inflation coupled with sound fiscal positions were not 
sufficient to avert the Great Depression. At the end of 2008, serious threats to the macro-
financial stability of the US and the EU materialised as some important macroeconomic 
imbalances, in particular the excesses in the US subprime residential mortgage market, 
started to unwind. A chain reaction of negative events was triggered including the default 
of Lehman brothers, which then resulted in a de facto closure of money markets and a 
near meltdown of financial systems as a whole. 
The lessons for EU fiscal surveillance from this, at times, chilling experience are 
twofold. First, achieving sound fiscal positions as required by the preventive dimension 
of the Pact is still a relevant condition for the functioning of the EMU. Second, fiscal 
discipline is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for overall macroeconomic 
stability. A truly and effective preventive dimension of economic surveillance needs to 
go beyond fiscal. It needs to keep an eye on other imbalances as well such as asset and 
real estate price developments and current account deficits.  
More generally, the understanding has gained ground that in order to safeguard overall 
macro-financial stability, monetary and fiscal policy making, the two classical tools of 
macro policy, need to be combined with other policy instruments, in particular, macro-
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prudential tools such as preventive mechanisms to control credit growth and/or asset 
price bubbles.27 But how should such a policy be implemented? 
As so often, a clear diagnosis does not automatically come with an equally clear idea 
about the appropriate therapy. What is apparent though is that a broadened economic 
surveillance, however it may be articulated and designed in practice, is likely to be more 
complex than the current system of macroeconomic governance. There are at least three 
major issues to be addressed: actors, enforcement and policies.  
Compared to fiscal and monetary policy making, which is controlled by national 
authorities and the ECB respectively, the responsibilities for important macro-prudential 
policy instruments (i.e. the regulation of banking operations) are currently shared among 
different players such as central banks, national regulatory agencies, and the new 
European supervisory entities.28 This fragmentation is a challenge for both the 
formulation and, in particular, the implementation of policy responses. By way of 
example, if macro-prudential surveillance was allocated across more than one actor, 
including the ECB, the independence of each institution and its respective policy 
assignments could be jeopardised. 
Assuming that the set of policy actors had been identified, there is then the issue of who 
does what and how? Conceivably, the European Commission would be in charge of 
monitoring macroeconomic developments across Member States. It would also raise the 
flag in case harmful developments or imbalances are detected. But who would take the 
policy actions? As long as economic policy – except monetary policy - remains a 
national prerogative, which, in accordance with article 121 of the Treaty, is co-ordinated 
within the Council, national authorities will remain in charge. The history of the SGP and 
its successive adaptations and reforms is the best case in point of how difficult it is to 
make a common system work where participants remain essentially sovereign nations. 
This is not to say that a broader economic surveillance is bound to fail. Rather, it 
underscores the importance of effective enforcement mechanisms, a far from trivial issue 
in the EU. 
If, on the basis of a comprehensive assessment, macroeconomic imbalances were found 
to pose a risk and actors were ready to intervene, there is still the final issue of finding 
the proper policy response. In the case of the present EU system of fiscal surveillance, 
the link between policy objective (a sound fiscal position) and the policy instrument 
(fiscal policy) is fairly direct. An equally direct link cannot be taken to exist regarding 
other macroeconomic imbalances such as current account deficits, excessive credit 
growth or asset bubbles. Moreover, and in line with the commonly accepted notation that 
each policy objective needs its own policy instrument, it would be wrong to assume that 
fiscal policy could be successfully used to achieve more than one policy objective. A 
broader economic surveillance must be able to mobilise an array of instruments 
independently or in combination, including macro-prudential instruments such as 
counter-cyclical capital requirements for banks, countercyclical loan-to-price ratios for 
mortgages.  
                                                 
27 This point is, for instance, underscored by Blanchard et al. (2010). 
28http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/434&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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In sum, whilst the crisis told us that stability-oriented macro-policies need to be 
broadened, the exact and optimal design of a broadened system is far from clear yet. The 
EU is entering a field which will involve a considerable amount of pioneering effort. 
Box 3: Broader Macroeconomic Surveillance 
Echoing the painful insight gained during the crisis that well behaved fiscal and monetary policy may not 
be sufficient to maintain overall macro-stability, the Commission’s legislative package of 29 September 
2010, following up on the communications of 12 May and 30 June, includes a proposal for a regulation on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.  
The regulation details a new surveillance procedure that looks beyond the remits of fiscal policy making, 
by monitoring overall macro-economic developments using a broad set of macroeconomic and macro-
financial indicators called scoreboard. This scoreboard, which is to be established by the Commission in 
consultations with the Council, is expected to cover all dimensions of macroeconomic and financial 
development, which in the light of past boom and bust cycles, may carry useful information about possible 
risks to the macro-financial stability of a countries. Likely candidates of indicators to be included in the 
scoreboard are the current account balance, the net foreign asset position, productivity and unit labour 
costs, the real effective exchange rate, private sector credit growth and asset prices developments.  
In analogy to the EU fiscal framework, and as indicated in the title of the legislative act, the new procedure 
includes a preventive and a corrective part. Under its preventive arm, the procedure seeks to detect, at an 
early stage, macroeconomic and/or macro-financial imbalances in individual Member States which have 
the potential to affect the functioning of the economy or the functioning of the Economic and Monetary 
Union or the Union as a whole. If such imbalances occur, the corrective arm sets out rules and procedures 
with a view to correcting them.  
Concretely, the new surveillance procedure is centred on an annual update of the scoreboard accompanied 
by a report in which the Commission may identify countries where the crossing of pre-established 
thresholds of the indicators included in the scoreboard coupled with a broader economic assessment of 
economic developments, signals the emergence or existence of imbalances. Depending on the degree of 
the imbalance identified in the monitoring process, the Member States concerned maybe confronted with 
more or less stringent encouragements to take policy actions. Two types of measures are foreseen. If a 
Member States is taken to experience imbalances it will be invited, as part of multilateral surveillance in 
accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty, to address them. If the imbalances are judged to be excessive, a 
more formal procedure will be opened– an excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) – whereby, very much in 
line with the EDP, the Member States concerned will be faced with a specific set of recommendations and 
deadlines towards the correction of the excessive imbalance. The EIP will be closed once the Council, on 
the basis of a recommendation by the Commission, concludes that the Member State is no longer 
experiencing excessive imbalances.   
In order to ensure enforcement, the legislative package adopted by the Commission on 29 September 2010 
also includes a regulation that foresees sanctions for, taking the form of yearly fines of maximum 0.1 
percentage point of GDP, in case euro area Member States do not comply with the provisions of the EIP, 
notably if they do not take appropriate corrective actions. 
 
4.4. Remedy Nr. 4: national fiscal frameworks and watchdogs 
The experience accumulated since the inception of the SGP has more than once exposed 
the fundamental dilemma of the EMU, namely that of a monetary union without a strong 
political union. When the fiscal responsibilities of the Pact clashed with fiscal 
sovereignty, the latter frequently or even normally prevailed.  
A particularly evident example of this pattern was the 2003 crisis of the SGP, when the 
Council decided not to proceed with the EDP for Germany and France as recommended 
by the Commission in line with the provisions of the Pact. The current set-up allows for 
the possibility and opportunity to form sufficiently large coalitions of countries with 
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similar fiscal predicaments so as to avoid sanctions. Even in the preventive arm of the 
Pact, where the sole surveillance instrument is moral suasion, a practice emerged 
whereby the Council did not want to consistently play tough with individual Member 
States mostly on account of solemn yet frequently void promises by national fiscal 
authorities to take necessary measures in the years to come.  
On the whole, the large degree of discretion with which fiscal surveillance is 
implemented and the ultimate power of the Member States within the Council to 
implement or not to implement the provision of the Pact are the main challenges to be 
addressed by any reform of the surveillance framework. Instruments and means have to 
be put in place to make the fiscal responsibilities implied by the common currency more 
operational.  
Some of the proposals advanced in the draft legislative package adopted by the 
Commission on 29 September 2010, implicitly or explicitly, draw on this sober and 
unavoidable conclusion. As indicated in the previous section, they aim at reducing the 
room for discretion in favour of strengthening the rule-based character of fiscal 
surveillance, for instance by introducing new sanctions and making them semi-automatic. 
While sanctions do not limit national sovereignty per se, a more automatic and consistent 
implementation of sanction mechanisms would at least make sure that, in the context of 
EMU, non-complying Member States have to take responsibility for their actions. 
Although the Great Recession made incontrovertibly clear that more co-ordination of 
fiscal policies would be required in EMU, it is fair to say that Member States are, at the 
moment, not willing to give up additional sovereignty in the fiscal area. A particularly 
blunt piece of evidence to that effect is the 2009 ruling of the German constitutional 
court on the Lisbon Treaty in which fiscal policy is identified as a vital instrument of 
national policy making. The reticence of devolving fiscal power across a broader set of 
countries manifested itself clearly when the Commission in the context of the so called 
EU Budget Review29 suggested complementing the current financing of the EU budget 
based on national transfers with appropriate EU taxes.30 This proposal triggered fierce 
negative reactions from a series of countries, including Germany, France and the UK, 
who very much disliked the idea of giving the supranational level the possibility to levy 
taxes independently or alongside national fiscal authorities. 
In such a fairly hostile environment, the only feasible alternative aimed at shaping the 
Member States’ fiscal behaviour in accordance with the requirements of the EMU is the 
establishment of stronger fiscal frameworks at the national level. In other words, if 
Member States are not willing to accept further restrictions on their fiscal sovereignty 
from the EU level, but feel committed to a smooth functioning of the EMU, the 
necessary fiscal discipline has to be attained by putting in place appropriate institutions, 
rules and procedure at the national level.  
                                                 
29 In December 2005, as part of the inter-institutional agreement underpinning the EU multiannual 
financial framework, the Council and the Parliament invited the Commission to 'carry out a full, wide 
ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resource, including the 
UK rebate […]; see Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 15-16 December 2005 
(15914/1/05) which refer to the agreement on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 as set out in the 
document of the Council of the European Union No. 15915/05. 
30 Financial Times of 9 August 2010: Brussels proposes ‘eurotaxes’ to fund EU. 
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The importance of national fiscal frameworks had already been acknowledged in the 
2005 Council report underpinning the first reform of the SGP, which stated that "national 
budgetary rules should be complementary to the Member States’ commitments under the 
SGP."31 However, in spite of this explicit tribute, the actual follow up was fairly weak or 
uneven, to say the least. Without any formal obligations only few countries, mostly 
countries with a ‘historical’ proclivity for fiscal discipline felt inclined to put in place 
national fiscal frameworks consistent with the requirements of the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. 32 
Against this backdrop, progress in the area of national fiscal frameworks can realistically 
only be expected to take place if Member States are confronted with appropriate 
incentives or sanctions. This conclusion overlaps with the thinking of Wyploswz (2010) 
who, as mentioned above, argues that, in the final analysis and barring stronger elements 
of fiscal federalism, national fiscal policy consistent with a smooth functioning of the 
EMU can only be expected to materialise if Member States tie their own hands which in 
turn will only happen if costs of lax fiscal policies are sufficiently high.  
Concretely, Wyplosz (2010) suggests a conditionality mechanism whereby Member 
States would only be able to benefit from EU safety nets such as the new EFSF or the 
purchase of government bonds by the ECB, if they adopt appropriate national fiscal 
frameworks. The incentive effect of such an arrangement is clear: the prospect of not 
having access to rescue mechanisms in times of crisis is expected to encourage countries 
to put in place rules, institutions and procedures that help avoid fiscal profligacy. 
In a similar way, Calmfors (2010) makes a plea for stronger national fiscal frameworks 
in the EU. In his view these should be based on four major elements: (i) well-defined 
fiscal objectives, (ii) ex-ante guidelines concerning the use of fiscal policy as a 
stabilization instrument, (iii) commitments to transparency, and (iv) incentives to avoid 
deviations from policy objectives. He also proposes the creation of independent fiscal 
institutions to serve as “watchdogs”.  
The idea of independent fiscal councils has gained ground in Europe. Several countries, 
including Sweden, United Kingdom and Hungary, have recently set up such institutions; 
Portugal is in the process of creating one.33 Although the record of these newly 
established councils is to scant for a proper evaluation, they carry, in our opinion, a 
substantial promise in improving fiscal policies across the EU.34 A system of EU-wide 
fiscal councils would be a significant step to foster sustainable fiscal policies at the 
national level. One key issue in running independent fiscal councils are appropriate 
institutional safeguards. A case in point is Hungary where at the end of 2010 the 
incoming government decided to significantly cut the budget and staff of the a body 
which had been established just two years earlier. 
 
Box 4: Domestic fiscal frameworks 
                                                 
31 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/legal_texts/compendium_en.htm. 
32 In 2009, Germany adopted the so called debt break, a constitutional law that largely mimics the SGP.  
33. See for example the survey found on http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/simon.wren-
lewis/fc/fiscal_councils.htm.  
34 See for example the analysis of Jonung and Larch (2006) suggesting that independent institutions for 
forecasting improve the quality of the budgetary process.  
 
 
 
36 
Conscious of the fact that the current intergovernmental landscape in Europe does not allow for transfers 
of fiscal sovereignty to the EU level, the Commission’s package of draft legislation adopted on 29 
September 2010 does not try to constrain fiscal policy making from the supranational level. Rather, it 
includes a directive aimed at shaping domestic fiscal frameworks and rules while at the same time 
respecting national preferences or idiosyncrasies. A domestic fiscal framework is defined as the elements 
that form the basis of national fiscal governance, i.e. the country-specific institutional policy setting that 
shapes fiscal policy-making at national level. 
Leaving aside the political limits to a further centralisation of fiscal-policy making, the focus on national 
fiscal frameworks is motivated by the rich literature showing that appropriate budgetary rules, institutions 
and procedures can improve the fiscal behaviour of a country, in particular they can strengthen the 
capacity to implement fiscal consolidation and, more generally, the long-term sustainability of public 
finances (see for instance Debrun et al. 2008). The empirical literature on fiscal frameworks corroborates 
the more general conclusion in macroeconomic analysis that rules are superior to discretion (see Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977 and Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
With reference to the provisions of Article 3 of Protocol 12 of the Treaty,35 the directive lists a number of 
elements and features which, if not already encompassed by domestic fiscal frameworks, Member States 
are expected to adopt through appropriate national legislative or administrative procedures so as to make 
national fiscal policy making more consistent with the priorities and objectives of the EU fiscal 
framework. The required elements indicated in the directive are organised around four headings: 
accounting and statistics, forecasts, numerical fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary frameworks. Under 
the first heading, Member States are encouraged to create a domestic system of accounting and statistics 
that guarantees a comprehensive, consistent and timely reporting in the area of government finances. 
Under the second heading, the directive recalls that budgetary planning should be transparent and based on 
realistic forecast. Under the third heading, Member States are asked to put in place numerical fiscal rules 
that promote the respect of the fiscal requirements of the SGP. The fourth and last heading asks Member 
States to embed their budgetary planning in a multi-annual framework so as to ensure consistency with the 
medium-term perspective of the SGP, in particular the achievement of the medium-term budgetary 
objective. 
In accordance with the hierarchy of EU secondary legislation, the actual implementation of the directive is 
left to Member States, which within a given time period following the entering into force of the directive 
are required to adopt national legislation/provisions. If this is not the case, the EU can, in principle, launch 
an infringement procedure against the Member States concerned. 
 
4.5. Remedy Nr. 5: escape clauses in times of severe crisis 
Ideally, a rule-based policy framework should be as comprehensive as possible, covering 
all possible states of the world. For the real world, however, it is practically impossible to 
design a rule that encompasses provisions for all types of contingencies. Unforeseen and 
unforecastable events will always occur. When they do, rules are likely to become too 
tight and untenable. The tensions within the EU fiscal surveillance framework arising 
from the economic and budgetary impact of the Great Recession are a perfect case in 
point. And there will be extreme events in the future putting pressure on the rules of the 
Pact as well. While many are tempted to assume or hope that another Great Recession is 
not likely to happen in the near future, the crisis highlighted that there is scope for 
rethinking the escape clauses of the Pact.  
The general idea is to complement the current set of rules with a pre-defined mechanism 
that requires national fiscal policy making to follow the rules under 'normal 
circumstances', but allows them to revert to discretion when economic circumstances 
                                                 
35 Article 3 of Protocol 12 of the Treaty requires Member States to 'ensure that national procedures in the 
budgetary area enable them to meet the obligations in this area deriving from these Treaties'. 
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turn particularly bad. Such a combination of rules and discretion can be shown to be 
better than unconditional rules or pure discretion.36  
In the case of the EU fiscal surveillance framework, the objective of an escape clause 
would be to temporarily suspend the provisions of the preventive and corrective arm of 
the Pact, so as to allow for discretionary fiscal expansions or other fiscal measure that 
would conflict with the provisions of the SGP but are warranted in the crisis context (e.g. 
support to financial institutions). The suspension should be called only in the event of a 
very serious economic downturn where automatic stabilisers are deemed to be too weak 
to prevent a deflationary downward spiral. In the same way, one would return to the rule-
based approach and/or not extend the suspension once economic circumstances improve. 
During the suspension period, discretion would not be without limits. Rather, fiscal 
expansions would follow specific principles so as to ensure both a high effectiveness (in 
terms of the expected impact of fiscal policy on output) and an easy reversal. 
The adoption of an explicit escape clause for the EU fiscal framework raises two major 
and interrelated issues: (i) the choice of institution to administer the escape clause, that is 
to trigger it and to close it, and (ii) the design of the escape clause specifying the 
circumstances when it could be enforced. To avoid an indiscriminate use, which would 
undermine the essence of a rule-based system, recourse to escape clauses must be 
credibly constrained. The escape clause must work as an emergency exit, not as the 
general exit in case of troubled fiscal times in the EU. 
On the first issue, the choice of institution, one effective way of achieving this would be 
to entrust an independent body or council with issuing a recommendation for switching 
off and back on the rules on the basis of a thorough assessment of economic 
circumstances. The recommendation would then be submitted for decision to the 
Commission. The European Commission by itself may also perform this function. It 
would carry out the necessary analysis and if warranted issue a recommendation to the 
Council and the Parliament. The use of an escape clause should be centrally administered 
and controlled.  
On the second issue, the specific design of the mechanism governing the escape clause, 
there is a question concerning how much of the mechanism should be codified and how 
much should be left to discretion. The spectrum of options is restricted by two extreme 
cases. In one case, the margins for discretion would be as limited as possible. The 
mechanism would not only indicate the responsibilities of the body entrusted with 
recommending the temporary suspension of the Pact; it would also pre-define the type of 
crisis and provide indications about the extent of the economic downturn that would 
allow for recurring to the escape clause. At the other end of the spectrum is the case in 
which the independent authority is only bound by its conscience and good judgment. The 
actual choice between the two extremes will inter alia depend on the actual degree of 
independence of the authority: if independence can be expected to be more nominal than 
real, a tighter design would be preferable. 
Box 5: Escape clauses 
                                                 
36 See for instance Bordo and Kydland (1996) and Drazen (2000). 
.  
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In spite of the objective difficulty to accommodate the need for fiscal expansion with the rules of the SGP 
during the Great Recession, the legislative reform package adopted by the Commission on 29 September 
2010 does not include a general escape clause providing for the temporary suspension of the Pact in the 
event of severe economic stress affecting the euro area or the EU as a whole. Preference was given to more 
circumscribed mechanisms whereby specific provisions of the preventive and/or the corrective arm can be 
put on hold or made more flexible if and when an economic downturn risks affecting the smooth 
functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union.  
Concretely, the legislative package foresees two new elements of flexibility in the event of severe 
economic stress. The first, relating to the preventive arm of the Pact, provides for the possibility to plan 
and implement fiscal policies which temporarily deviate from the appropriate adjustment path required in 
normal times. The idea is to allow Member States to implement revenue reducing and/or expenditure 
increasing measures in difficult times with a view to stabilise aggregate economic activity on top of the 
effect produced by automatic stabilisers. Under current provisions, Member States that had not reached 
their MTO were always expected to pursue and achieve an annual improvement of the structural budget 
balance and to stay clear of expansionary measures.  
The second element of flexibility concerns the corrective arm of the SGP. Whilst government deficits in 
excess of the 3% of GDP reference value will continue to trigger an EDP, the legislative proposal of the 
Commission offers the possibility to change, and in practice to ease, the recommendations setting the path 
of budgetary correction in the event of a serve economic downturn that affects the smooth functioning of 
the Economic and Monetary Union. Compared to current legislation this provisions introduces a sort of 
safety valve, a mechanism by which Member States concerned will be given a pause for breath when the 
overall economic situation precipitates. 
The main reason for choosing a 'light' and more selective approach to escape clauses as opposed to a more 
general mechanism is political. With a relatively fresh memory about the lengthy and stony path leading to 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it was concluded that a new reform of the EU economic surveillance 
framework should be implemented taking the existing set of primary laws as given. This political 
constraint effectively excluded a general escape clause for the EDP, because the key provisions governing 
that procedure are laid out in the Treaty. 
 
4.6. Remedy Nr. 6: crisis resolution mechanisms 
The 'no-assistance' principle of the SGP, whereby fiscal sovereignty was expected to 
apply also in times of crises, including the possibility of default, turned out not to be 
credible in extreme circumstances. In 2010, when Greece concretely faced the risk of 
insolvency, the EU following lengthy negotiations, eventually agreed on a rescue 
package jointly with the IMF consisting in intergovernmental loans at below-market 
interest rates.  
Although a formidable sign of solidarity, the decision to go to Greece's rescue was not 
completely altruistic, as we highlighted above. The crisis also showed how uncertainty 
about the 'end game', arrangements for handling cases of illiquidity or insolvency, would 
fuel worries among financial market participants and significantly amplify risk aversion 
towards sovereign debt of countries with still liquid, yet strained public finances. Finally, 
the lack of crisis resolution mechanism has also weighed on the ECB's independence. 
The monetary authority of the euro area was basically 'forced' by events to engage in 
non-orthodox monetary policy measures to safeguard the stability of the financial 
systems, at the risk of potentially jeopardising its statutory objective of price stability.37 
                                                 
37 In mid-May 2010, amid renewed tensions in the financial systems of some euro-area Member States and 
following the ECOFIN council meeting of 9/10 May 2010, the ECB started buying government bonds of 
troubled EU countries on the secondary market. While the quantities involved were relatively minor 
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The main challenge associated with the design of a crisis resolution mechanism is the 
risk of moral hazard. If Member States know in advance that there will be a safety net in 
the event of a crisis, they may be induced to be less prudent in their conduct of fiscal 
policy. Moral hazard can be limited in two different ways: (i) by requiring Member 
States to take their own precautions during normal times, and (ii) by submitting financial 
support from third parties to strict conditions for the duration of the programme Member 
States would have to partially wave sovereignty in the field of fiscal and economic policy 
making. In all likelihood, it was the concern of moral hazard coupled with the resistance 
to the idea of fiscal federalism that contributed to the drawn-out debate on what to do in 
the face of the Greek sovereign debt crisis at the beginning of 2010.  
A priori, there are at least four instruments that can be used in a crisis situation: loans to 
illiquid or insolvent euro-area Member States syndicated by a lender of last resort with a 
below-market interest rate; outright cross-country transfers; national rainy-day funds to 
be accumulated in 'good' times and to be used in times of financial difficulty; and an 
orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. The first two involve elements of fiscal 
federalism (Member States concerned benefit from financial aid granted by the rest of the 
euro area); the latter two do not.  
These four basic instruments of crisis resolution can be combined in different ways 
within different institutional setups. In the political and academic debate, a range of 
variants has been put forward and discussed. In fact, among the many issues discussed in 
this paper, crisis resolution has by far attracted the highest level of attention in the public 
debate largely because it represented the most evident failing. We would claim this is 
somewhat flawed: the stronger the provisions for crisis prevention and crisis mitigation 
are, the less likely it is that a crisis resolution scheme will ever be used.   
A prominent proposal is the one of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) advanced by Gros 
and Mayer (2010). It owes its prominence to at least two elements. First, the proposal is 
fairly comprehensive combining elements of crisis prevention with elements of crisis 
resolution. According to the proposal, the EMF would build up rainy-day funds for each 
Member State financed via penalties to be paid for exceeding the Treaty reference values 
of the deficit and/or the debt. These funds would then be used in times of financial 
difficulties up to the amount accumulated by each Member State. Additional money, 
borrowed by the EMF on the market, would be made available only if the Member State 
concerned accepted strict conditions of fiscal and economic discipline. If both the 
accumulated funds and borrowing by the EMF were not sufficient to stem financial 
difficulties, the EMF would proceed to debt restructuring on the basis of agreed haircuts. 
Second, the EMF proposal addresses the moral hazard issue associated with resolution 
mechanism in more than one way. Member States are first required to make provisions 
for difficult times whenever they breach the thresholds of the Treaty. If those provisions 
do not turn out to be sufficient, Member States cannot count on unconditional aid. The 
price to be paid for financial support would be the actual loss of fiscal sovereignty.  
                                                                                                                                                 
compared to the ECB's overall balance sheet and the central bank announced that the purchase of 
government bonds would be sterilised, observers worried that this move would eventually undermine 
policies aimed at price stability and reward fiscally irresponsible Member States. 
 
 
 
40 
In spite of its comprehensive nature and its sound conceptual underpinning, the EMF has 
not received general approval. Some commentators (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010) 
pointed out that an EMF could only be established after a Treaty change, a process which 
in the recent past proved to be a very tedious, risky and above all lengthy endeavour.38 
The main goals of the EMF à la Gros and Mayer (2010), they argue, can be achieved by 
making use of and pooling existing institutions, more specifically through a co-operation 
between the EU and the IMF.  
Another recent proposal, advanced by Bofinger and Ried (2010), seeks to combine 
elements of crisis resolution with elements of crisis prevention. Within a framework 
dubbed Fiscal Policy Consolidation Pact, Member States would benefit from guarantees 
for new issuance of government debt provided they accepted a number of restrictions on 
fiscal policy making; in particular if they committed to (i) achieving a balanced budget 
through the adoption of stringent expenditure rules, and (ii) adopting an automatic tax 
increase law that would be triggered whenever a country departs from the agreed 
adjustment path. An orderly default procedure would apply to countries that decided not 
to join the consolidation pact.  
Although the Consolidation Pact à la Bofinger and Ried (2010) offers an interesting 
combination of incentives and disincentive, it is not clear if, in the extreme, an orderly 
default would actually be accepted. In view of the strong degree of interdependence of 
financial markets in Europe a sovereign default, even if orderly, may carry the serious 
risk of contagion and thus be shunned.  
The issue of orderly default is addressed in greater detail in the proposal by Gianviti et 
al. (2010). Following up on the idea resolutely advocated by Germany in autumn 2010, 
they propose a crisis resolution mechanism that combines 'last-resort' financing to 
financially strained EU governments with a procedure for negotiating debt-restructuring. 
Specifically, Gianviti et al. (2010) think of establishing a special court, possible a special 
chamber of the European Court of Justice that would have to balance the interests of the 
debtors and its lenders and keep moral hazard on both sides to a minimum. 
Box 6: Crisis management and resolution 
Against the background of pressing events, in particular the 2010 sovereign debt crisis involving primarily 
Greece but also touching upon Spain, Portugal and Ireland, crisis resolution was the area where EU policy 
intervention came first. The discussion of alternative crisis resolution regimes tilted very quickly towards 
rescue mechanisms, involving loans to ailing countries, as any other option, especially default, was 
deemed to produce effects well beyond the country concerned with the possibility of a general meltdown 
of financial markets.  
Between the end of April and mid-May 2010, three European instruments were adopted: the adjustment 
programme for Greece, the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). An important communality of all three instruments is that loans to Member 
States are granted subject to strict conditions. 
                                                 
38 More recently, there seems to have been a reassessment of the political feasibility of a Treaty change. 
Following the Franco-German agreement of 18 October 2010, the European Council of 29 October 2010 
invited its President to undertake consultations with the Member States on a limited change of the Treaty 
to establish a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area; 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117496.pdf  
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The adjustment programme for Greece constitutes an ad hoc intergovernmental arrangement. It was 
negotiated jointly by the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission.39 On the European side, the 
financial aid to Greece takes the form of bilateral loans, loans granted by a group a Member States, 
amounting to € 80 billion; the European Commission acted as the representative of EU Member States. 
The IMF agreed to participate in the adjustment programme with an additional pledge of up to € 30 billion. 
To accompany the ad hoc agreement for Greece, the ECOFIN Council, in an extraordinary meeting held 
on 10 May 2010, decided to set up a temporary two-tier system aimed at providing financial help to ailing 
sovereigns, consisting of the EFSM and the EFSF. The EFSM is a community instrument empowering the 
Commission to borrow up to € 60 billion on the financial markets; EU own resources of the EU budget 
serve as guarantee. The mechanism is based on the provisions of Article 122 of the Treaty according to 
which Member States can receive Union financial assistance if 'threatened with serious difficulties caused 
by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control.'  
The EFSM is complemented by the EFSF, an intergovernmental instrument with an overall firing power of 
around € 440. The EFSF operates through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) located in Luxembourg which 
issues bonds on behalf of and guaranteed on a pro rata basis by participating Member States, i.e. the 16 
Member States whose currency is the euro. The funds raised by the EFSF are lent on to euro-area countries 
subject to strict conditions negotiated by the European Commission in liaison with the ECB and the IMF. 
Linked to the EFSF operations, the IMF stands ready to add € 250 billion of its own resources. Conscious 
about the fact that the setting up of the three resolution instruments described in this box was largely 
motivated by urgency, the Commission in its Communication of 12 May and June 30 2010 underlined that 
additional work would be carried out to design a robust and more permanent framework for crisis 
management. Concrete proposals to that effect have not been made public yet.  
 
4.7. Remedy Nr. 7: linking structural reforms and fiscal sustainability 
Two years before the introduction of the euro, Obstfeld (1997) offered a wide-ranging 
review of the pros and cons of the EMU. At the core of his assessment was the insight 
that countries adopting the single European currency would only survive if they 
eliminated real rigidities in labour markets because they were faced with the loss of a 
major channel of adjustment, namely nominal exchange rates. As a result of this insight, 
he assumed that the introduction of the euro would put pressure on social partners and 
policy makers to implement the reforms needed to make labour and possibly also product 
markets more flexible so as to allow for wage and price adjustments necessary to make 
the euro viable.  
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Obstfeld (1997) was only partially right. He 
was spot on with his analysis that in the absence of structural reforms existing rigidities 
in euro-area countries would eventually create serious adjustment problems. The 
accumulation of large current account imbalances and the underlying cross-country 
divergences in competitiveness observed in the years ahead of the crisis speaks volumes. 
But then, he was wrong in assuming that the prospect of more difficult adjustment 
processes would fuel a comprehensive and serious reform process. To be fair, various 
reforms have been deliberated and implemented across Europe. Biroli et al. (2010) 
suggest that the adjustment dynamics of price competitiveness after the monetary union has 
increased as product and labour market regulations have become less stringent on the back of 
national reform efforts. On the whole, however, reforms were not very decisive and results 
have been mixed not least because more tricky issues have not been addressed. In line 
with the predictions of the political economy literature, it took a major economic and 
                                                 
39 The economic adjustment programme for Greece can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf 
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sovereign debt crisis to remind us that a smooth functioning of the EMU requires labour 
and product market flexibility so as ensure a balanced economic development across 
participating countries.  
Against the backdrop of the Great Recession, the debate on how to rekindle the European 
reform programme has again moved up the policy agenda. In March 2010, the European 
Commission adopted a communication in which it laid out a blueprint for a new and 
ambitious growth strategy, dubbed Europe 2020, were structural reforms are the main 
delivery mechanism.40 Following the Commission communication and discussions held 
in the Council, the European Council reached an agreement on the new strategy on 17 
June 2010 (see Box 7). 
Why should the new European agenda for structural reforms work better than its 
predecessors, i.e. the Lisbon Strategy and the Strategy for Growth and Jobs? A number 
of facilitating factors can play a role. First, crises typically act as catalysts for major 
reforms. They frequently emerge from a reform backlog that makes the status quo less 
and less tenable. This assessment is vindicated by current policy debates in the EU 
Member States. Structural reforms are receiving increasing attention; e.g. the Spanish 
government has negotiated and implemented a labour market reform, France a reform of 
the public pension system, Greece is expected to implement a number of major reforms 
as part of the EU/IMF rescue package. 
Second, and linked to the first point, there is growing awareness and concern that the 
Great Recession is likely to have a lasting impact on medium to long-term growth. In the 
face of this possibility, constituencies and policy makers can be expected to be more 
willing to accept structural change as the benefits (costs) of the status quo are 
progressively declining (increasing) compared to the benefits (costs) of change.  
Third, the new strategy includes an important innovation in the governance structure. 
Learning from past experience, Europe 2020 envisages a clearer focus, with a more 
limited number of policy goals and transparent benchmarks for assessing progress. 
Moreover, in an attempt to strengthen ownership on the side of Member States, the 
European Council will be entrusted with the strategic leadership of the reform strategy. 
This will mark an important break with the past when the European Council was the last 
element in the decision making process. By putting the European Council in the 'driving 
seat', the strategy is expected to receive the necessary political momentum; instead of 
being perceived as a burden imposed by 'Brussels' it should be viewed as a common 
responsibility.   
Notwithstanding these facilitating factors, the current juncture also holds some potential 
inhibitors of structural reform, namely a growing suspicion towards the liberalisation of 
financial markets and, as a result, growing calls on policy makers to tighten regulation. 
This may pose a problem because, judging from available evidence, financial markets 
help absorb possible short-term losses associated with major structural reforms (see Buti 
et al. 2009, 2010).  
More generally, there are a number of potential interaction and sequencing effects across 
markets that need or should be taken into account when designing reform programmes. 
                                                 
40 http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/index_en.htm  
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History teaches us that the design and timing of reform packages can have an important 
impact on the odds of success. For instance, Nicoletti et al. (2001) and Conway et al. 
(2005) point out that regulations in product and labour markets are closely related. There 
is also evidence that product market liberalisation has often preceded labour market 
reforms (Brandt et al., 2005) because product market reforms can lead to an expansion of 
activity and labour demand. Higher labour demand in turn provides a favourable 
environment for labour market reforms as better employment opportunities diminish 
workers' motivation to ask for more job protections for instance through stricter 
employment protection legislation (Koeniger and Vindigni, 2003). 
Although very comprehensive in terms of the markets that are expected to undergo 
structural reform, Europe 2020 is silent about the issue of sequencing. It should and can 
be taken up at a later stage when Member States put forward their concrete reform 
programmes. A failure to do so could make the reform process much more difficult. This 
in turn would undermine the over-all credibility of EU economic governance, thus also 
of the Pact. 
Box 7: Structural reforms and integrated assessment cycle. 
Under the Europe 2020 strategy, different EU surveillance processes are planned to be combined so as to 
form one integrated surveillance framework. The procedural innovations underpinning this integration of 
surveillance is the so called European Semester, which will align the timing of surveillance of fiscal and 
other macro-economic policies. In practice, Member States will be required to submit Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCP) and National Reform Programmes (NRPs) at the same time, by mid-
April each year. On the basis of the two programmes the Commission will prepare concomitantly 
assessments of the fiscal and macro-structural situation of the Member States which will then form the 
basis for policy recommendations. The main idea of aligning different surveillance processes is of course 
to achieve greater consistency. Possible interactions and interlinkages between fiscal policy and structural 
policies are expected to come out clearer. 
Within the integrated assessment cycle of Europe 2020, fiscal policy is expected to play a double role: to 
deliver fiscal consolidation and to improve the quality of public finances. Getting public finances back on 
a sustainable path is seen as a crucial condition to restore sustainable growth and jobs. As a result of the 
crisis, government deficits and debt levels have reached unsustainable levels in most EU countries. They 
need to be addressed; in some cases the need for consolidation has been heightened by the growing 
concerns expressed by financial markets. At the same time, when designing and implementing 
consolidation packages, fiscal policy makers are expected to 'do more with less' by increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of government activities and by prioritising 'growth-enhancing spending’ such 
as education and skills, R&D and innovation and investment in networks, e.g. high-speed internet, energy 
and transport interconnections. To achieve this, fiscal authorities will have to implement comprehensive 
reforms within the government sector and as part of their overall reform strategy. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The euro is a young currency. It has to go through crises and adjustment and learning.41 
We are in such a period. The future sustainability of the euro is dependent on how well 
policy makers learn and adjust from the present events. Measured by the intensity of the 
current debate in both the academic and political arena, the intention to draw the 
necessary lessons from the crisis to improve EU fiscal and economic surveillance is 
unambiguous. While there is no doubt that the actual triggers of the crisis lay outside 
                                                 
41 The case for policy learning as a necessary condition for the sustainability of the euro is made in Jonung 
(2002). 
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Europe, the prevailing narrative acknowledges that weaknesses in the institutional design 
of the European and Monetary Union (EMU), including and in particular its economic 
surveillance framework, contributed to the at times dramatic turns the crisis took in 
Europe. In case Member States had abided by the rules of the Pact, the crisis would still 
have seriously affected their public finances, but in many cases the situation would have 
turned out less dismal and dramatic. 
Against this backdrop, the academic and political debate has generated a wide range of 
policy proposals. In relative terms, and without having a precise count, the issue of crisis 
resolution has attracted particular attention not least because the acute sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece in early 2010 was the most severe piece of evidence of the shortcomings 
of the existing rules.  
Alongside the intense academic and political discussion, the European Commission has 
been active on several fronts. In a bid to stem tangible risk of sovereign defaults, it has, 
in collaboration with the Member States, brokered a number of new operational 
instruments for crisis management. At the same time, assuming its right of initiative in 
these matters it has also mapped out reform of the fiscal and economic surveillance.  
Taken as a whole, the Commission’s reform proposals are fairly comprehensive. They 
address or try to address most if not all the weaknesses of the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework the Great Recession has blatantly exposed. Assuming that the reform will 
finally be approved, the major innovations include the following points: (i) more power 
for the Commission to check government finance statistics of Member States; (ii) a new 
series of sanctions and disincentives, which can take effect semi-automatically at an early 
stage of the surveillance process; (iii) Member States will be formally required to put in 
place national fiscal framework to make them compatible with the objectives of the EU 
surveillance; (iv) a broader surveillance framework looking beyond fiscal developments 
so as to monitor and correct other macro imbalances that may jeopardise the smooth the 
functioning of the EMU; (v) a better and more consistent integration of different EU 
surveillance processes. 
Like all reform processes, the ongoing reform of the EU economic surveillance process 
was carried out subject to a number of important political constraints of which two are of 
particular relevance.  
First, after the very difficult experience with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it became 
evident that a sufficiently timely reform of the EU surveillance framework could only be 
had by taking primary legislation as given, that is without further changes to the Treaty. 
As a result, the reform measures taken by the Commission, and in particular the 
legislative package adopted on 29 September 2010, are to be seen as the result of a kind 
of constrained optimisation. Some of the initiative may have taken a different form if 
changes to the Treaty had been an option. This is for instance the case for robust escape 
clauses, providing for the possibility to effectively and temporarily suspend the Pact, as 
opposed to formally carrying on with the standard surveillance procedure when their 
rational is completely lost in the light of severe economic stress.  
Second, and linked with the first point, there is little or no appetite among Member States 
for further fiscal integration. In spite of the fact that the crisis clearly exposed the limits 
of decentralised fiscal policy making in a monetary union, restrictions on the national 
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prerogative of fiscal policy making beyond the current provisions of the Treaty would 
not be accepted at this stage. Evidently, this position has important implications for the 
design and extent of any reform. It effectively excludes a number of proposals put 
forward in the policy debate which in one way or another would require a further pooling 
of economic policy sovereignty at the European level, e.g. any form of EU-based transfer 
mechanisms. At the same time it is fair to say that many of the proposals advanced by the 
Commission constitute important progress and would have been completely unthinkable 
before the crisis. In fact, the legislative proposals advanced by the Commission 
constitutes a balancing act which seeks to reconcile the needs of a broader and more 
effective surveillance taking on board the lessons of the crisis with the reality of 
decentralised fiscal policy making carried out by sovereign actors.  
A clear example is the plan to introduce disincentives and sanctions which would be 
applied in a semi-automatic fashion: they can be avoided only if the Council explicitly 
votes against them. Such a mechanism, while acknowledging the ultimate authority of 
the Member States within the Council, underscores the responsibility of national 
authorities within the EMU. As a matter of principle, sanctions are due if national fiscal 
policy making deviates from the tenets of the EU surveillance framework. They can only 
be stopped through a deliberate act by and with the necessary majority within the 
Council.  
The crisis has invited a new-old player to enter the scene as a main actor, namely the 
financial market. In the thinking behind the original Pact, financial markets were thought 
to be insufficient to instil fiscal discipline. The ambition was to put in place a set of 
common rules which beyond the potential role of financial market forces would keep 
national fiscal policies in line with the overall objectives of fiscal and monetary stability. 
The past ten years have demonstrated that the EU system has not lived up to its original 
ambition allowing the comeback of the merciless financial market vigilantes. Giving 
credit to the promises underlying the original philosophy of the Pact, they had kept quiet 
for long time. Spreads on sovereign debts were minimal within the euro area. 
Now the crisis has allowed the financial markets to make a return as the ultimate and 
painful signalling device. Through the very high spreads given to sovereign debt of some 
euro-area countries they have put additional pressure on policy makers to reform the 
existing EU governance system. Going forward, they are likely to serve as a good 
complement to the reforms being undertaken. In particular, government bond spreads 
will signal how credible any reformed EU governance structure will be.  
To sum up our discussion, history tells us that deep economic crises initiate a learning 
process – a search for new policies to avoid future economic calamity. EU is now in the 
middle of such a learning process. It is impossible to say at this juncture how successful 
it will be. We do not know if EU will learn the right lessons. However, in the past, EU 
has been able to adjust to new conditions and new circumstances. There are strong 
reasons to believe that proper policy adjustments will be forthcoming, initiated and 
supported by the workings of financial markets. EU has a golden opportunity to learn 
from the mistakes of the past. Don’t miss a good crisis – like the present one.  
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Annex: Quantifying the potential benefits of an expenditure-rule-based surveillance 
The potential advantages of an expenditure-rule-based approach outlined in Section 4.2 
can be quantified by a simple mechanic simulation. We compare the actual course of 
public finances in a selection of euro-area countries in 1997-2009 with a counterfactual 
path where the growth rate of per capita real current primary expenditure is capped at the 
average rate of per capita real GDP observed in the six preceding years.42 Everything else 
is kept unchanged, revenues, capital and interest expenditure, as well as price and growth 
figures. Real revenues and real expenditures are obtained by applying the GDP deflator. 
We focus on per capita figures because they give a more intuitive narrative, as they 
control for the size of population across Member States.  
Table 1 
General government budget balance
Actual versus counterfactual
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
Actual Exp. 
rule
1997 -5.89 -4.79 -3.51 -3.31 -3.38 -3.38 1.44 1.47 -1.25 -1.25 -2.64 -2.64 -3.32 -2.93 -2.67 -2.11
1998 -3.82 -1.79 -3.39 -1.73 -3.22 -2.77 2.27 2.29 -0.87 -0.87 -2.17 -2.17 -2.61 -2.23 -3.07 -2.51
1999 -3.10 0.24 -2.79 0.09 -1.43 -0.80 2.61 2.65 0.41 0.53 -1.46 -0.88 -1.78 -0.79 -1.78 -0.87
2000 -3.73 1.77 -2.97 0.74 -1.00 -0.29 4.79 4.84 1.97 2.08 1.31 1.93 -1.47 -0.49 -0.86 0.32
2001 -4.44 1.58 -4.32 -0.37 -0.66 0.04 0.93 1.54 -0.25 -0.13 -2.82 -2.21 -1.56 -0.57 -3.10 -1.70
2002 -4.84 2.31 -2.89 1.19 -0.48 0.24 -0.31 0.38 -2.11 -1.97 -3.66 -3.02 -3.16 -1.80 -3.01 -1.59
2003 -5.71 2.09 -2.95 1.28 -0.23 0.49 0.41 1.13 -3.15 -2.91 -4.03 -3.40 -4.12 -2.73 -3.54 -2.09
2004 -7.40 0.79 -3.38 1.42 -0.35 0.39 1.41 2.18 -1.77 -1.52 -3.78 -3.15 -3.63 -2.23 -3.56 -2.09
2005 -5.33 2.96 -6.05 -0.09 0.96 1.72 1.67 2.47 -0.28 -0.04 -3.31 -2.68 -2.96 -1.56 -4.37 -2.89
2006 -3.18 5.05 -3.94 1.92 2.02 2.82 3.00 3.84 0.52 2.58 -1.64 -1.04 -2.32 -0.93 -3.33 -1.86
2007 -3.96 5.84 -2.65 3.12 1.91 3.15 0.25 2.24 0.17 2.74 0.19 0.78 -2.73 -1.36 -1.48 -0.02
2008 -7.75 3.11 -2.75 3.72 -4.06 -1.62 -7.15 -3.53 0.68 3.34 0.04 0.63 -3.40 -2.02 -2.72 -1.02
2009 -12.75 -1.27 -7.89 1.51 -11.21 -7.31 -12.48 -7.42 -4.74 -1.09 -3.34 -1.64 -8.27 -6.29 -5.26 -2.99
2010 -12.33 -0.91 -7.96 1.57 -10.06 -6.11 -14.66 -8.75 -6.21 -1.84 -4.93 -2.78 -8.26 -6.28 -5.35 -2.98
Note: The columns entitles Exp. rule report the results of a simulation whereby the annual increase of real current primary per capita expenditure 
is capped at average real per capita GDP growth observed in the six preceeding years. All other variables (i.e. revenues, GDP and inflation) are 
unchanged at their actual value.
EL PT ES IE NL DE FR IT
The results of the simulation (reported in Table 1) clearly show that capping the growth 
rate of real per capita current primary expenditure at the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita would have generated much sounder fiscal positions. Starting with a particularly 
prominent case, if Greece had followed the postulated expenditure-rule and/or if EU 
fiscal surveillance had succeeded in enforcing the cap on expenditure growth as of 1997, 
instead of running a headline deficit of 4% of GDP in 2007, the country would have 
recorded a budgetary surplus of close to 6% of GDP; in 2010 the comparison is between 
an actual deficit of close to 12.7% of GDP and 0.9% of GDP.  
As one would expect, important difference are also visible during the previous boom-
bust cycle. In 2001, the last year of the ITC boom, an actual deficit of 4.5% compares 
with a surplus of 1.6% of GDP. A similar picture emerges in the case of Portugal. If 
Portugal had applied the cap on real expenditure growth in the sample period, it would 
have entered both the 2001 recession and the Great Recession with comfortable budget 
                                                 
42 In years where real current primary expenditure per capita grew faster than the benchmark for real GDP 
growth per capita (faster than average per capita real GDP growth over the past six years) it is cut back to 
the benchmark. In all other years we take actual expenditure growth. 
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surpluses: in 2007 the surplus would have been close to 4% of GDP compared to an 
actual deficit of 2.7% of GDP. 
Less dramatic, although still significant, differences are to be noted also for other 
countries like Spain and Ireland. In the case of Spain, compliance with the cap on real 
per capita expenditure growth would have resulted in a budget surplus of 3.1% of GDP 
in 2007 instead of an actual surplus of 1.9% of GDP. In 2010, even the cap would not 
prevent a deficit of 6.1% of GDP but would still compare favourably with a deficit 
forecast of 10.1% of GDP. The relatively large gap mainly originates in 2006-2008 when 
real current primary expenditure growth per capita accelerated visibly from 2% to 5% per 
year, while average real GDP growth per capita had slowed significantly from around 
3% in 2003/04 to 1.8% in 2007/08.  
Essentially the same happened in Ireland: real current primary expenditure per capita 
rose at increasing rates, on the back of revenue windfall, but coupled with slowing 
growth. In 2007, the counterfactual Irish budget balance would have been in a surplus of 
2.2% instead of just 0.2% of GDP. In 2010, the comparison would be between a deficit 
of 8.7% of GDP and 14.7% of GDP.  
The potential improvement of public finances resulting from the cap on real expenditure 
growth is lower for countries that are generally more disciplined. Nevertheless, some 
common patterns are visible also there, notably the spending of revenue windfalls. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, real current primary expenditures per capita recorded sharp 
increases in 2006/07 on the back of temporarily higher tax content of GDP, but with 
unchanged rates of real per capita GDP growth. As a result, the Netherlands entered the 
Great Recession with a marginal budget surplus of 0.2% of GDP as opposed to a surplus 
of 3% of GDP that could have been had by anchoring expenditure growth to real GDP 
growth in per capita terms. 
The simulated budget balance assumes that as of 1997 real current primary expenditure 
per capita is capped at average real per capita GDP growth of the past 6 years. All other 
variables are unchanged at their actual value. 
The expenditure rule would have delivered a better fiscal performance; but what about 
the fiscal stance? Does the cap on expenditure growth affect the counter-cyclicality of 
discretionary fiscal policy? The answer to this question is a clear no. Table 2 reports the 
results of standard panel regressions where the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) is modelled as a function of the budgetary situation in the previous year 
and the cyclical situation (as measured by real GDP growth). The estimates indicate that 
the changes in the CAPB implied by an expenditure rule are counter-cyclical; i.e. the 
CAPB increases when real growth turns negative and vice versa. 
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Table 2 
Counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy in euro area countries
Panel regression with fixed effects (1997-2010)
Dependent variable: change in CAPB
actual capped expenditure growth
Constant -1,01 -0,34
(0.00) (-0.01)
real GDP growth 0,33 0,22
(0.00) (0.00)
budget balance (t-1) -0,29 -0,24
(0.00) (0.00)
No of obs. 195 195
Durbin-Watson 1,8 2,07
 
